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Professional Speech at Scale
Cassandra Burke Robertson* and Sharona Hoffman**
ABSTRACT
Regulatory actions affecting professional speech are facing new challenges from
all sides. On one side, the Supreme Court has grown increasingly protective of
professionals’ free speech rights, and it has subjected regulations affecting that speech to
heightened levels of scrutiny that call into question traditional regulatory practices in both
law and medicine. On the other side, technological developments, including the growth of
massive digital platforms and the introduction of artificial intelligence programs, have
created brand new problems of regulatory scale. Professional speech is now able to reach
a wide audience faster than ever before, creating risks that misinformation will cause
public harm long before regulatory processes can gear up to address it.
This article examines how these two trends interact in the fields of health-care
regulation and legal practice. It looks at how these forces work together both to create new
regulatory problems and to shape the potential government responses to those problems.
It analyzes the Supreme Court’s developing caselaw on professional speech and predicts
how the Court’s jurisprudence is likely to shape current legal challenges in law and
medicine. The Article further examines the regulatory challenges posed by the change in
scale generated by massive digital platforms and the introduction of artificial intelligence.
It concludes by recommending ways in which government regulators can meet the new
challenges posed by technological development without infringing on protected speech.
The crux of our proposal is that incremental change in the traditional state regulatory
process is insufficient to meet the challenges posed by changes in technological scale.
Instead, it is time to ask bigger questions about the underlying goals and first principles
of professional regulation.
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INTRODUCTION

Living in an era of massive digital platforms has significant
implications for professional speech. Mass communication used to be the
province of established media outlets—newspapers, television and radio
stations, and magazines. But the internet revolution made mass
communications available to the individual, and the growth of social
media, along with easier access to video production and distribution,
further facilitated communication.1 The growth of massive digital platforms
has had implications for regulation in general, and matters historically
falling into the areas of medical, legal, or other licensed professional
practice are no exception to that trend.
Doctors and lawyers can now communicate with large audiences;
their influence is no longer tied to one-on-one consultations. Moreover,
individuals who lack professional training and licensing can similarly
communicate with large audiences about legal and medical matters,
sometimes spreading harmful misinformation. Finally, technology enables
lawyers and medical professionals to meet face-to-face with clients and
patients across state lines without the inconvenience of travel. All of these
new capabilities raise serious questions about professional licensing.
The growth in online communication is accompanied by the
Supreme Court’s increasingly strong interest in, and protection of,
commercial and professional speech. In a 2018 case, the Court held that
professional speech was not categorically different from any other type of
speech.2 This means that going forward, most restrictions on professional
speech will be analyzed in the same manner as restrictions on nonprofessionals’ speech—that is, the speech limitations will typically fall
under strict scrutiny, the hardest standard to satisfy. Scholars have
warned that such a ruling would significantly restrict states’ long-standing
authority to engage in professional regulation—and that such restrictions
could have far-ranging consequences in areas such as law and medicine.3

1

Paul Ohm, Regulating at Scale, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 546 (2018).

2

Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).

3

Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First Amendment and the FDA: Toward A More
Democratic Political Economy, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 179, 194 (2018) (“These cases pose
significant risks to public health, whether from more extensive (and less well-understood)
off-label uses of drugs or more extensive (and less well-understood) uses of electronic and
conventional cigarettes.”); William French, Note, This Isn't Lochner, It's the First
Amendment: Reorienting the Right to Contract and Commercial Speech, 114 NW. U.L. REV.
469, 471 (2019) (acknowledging critics’ fears that “as soon as the First Amendment wholly
protects commercial speech, economic legislation as the country knows it will crumble”);
Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith's First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165,
182 (2015) (questioning whether the Supreme Court’s increased protection of First
Amendment rights means that “those who engage in ‘occupational speech,’ like lawyers
and doctors, have an equivalent right to engage in deliberately false speech”).

5
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This Article examines how professional regulation will change given
both increasing judicial scrutiny and new technological capabilities. It reenvisions how professional regulation can adapt to the change in
regulatory scale and, at the same time, meet the Supreme Court’s
increasingly high bar for speech limitations. Part II begins with an analysis
of the Supreme Court’s new landscape for regulations affecting speech. It
examines the constitutional law of professional speech, analyzing how the
Court has increasingly protected the speech rights of professionals. Part
III extends the speech analysis further into the particular contexts of law
and health care, analyzing how current controversies in professional
regulation will be affected by the Supreme Court’s higher bar for speech
protection and examining how far the state can go in regulating the
provision of legal and medical advice.
Part IV moves to the particular regulatory challenges posed by the
change in scale generated by both massive digital platforms and artificial
intelligence. We often think of the doctor-patient and lawyer-client
relationships as existing within a professional dyad. But what happens
when lawyers and doctors can reach much larger audiences online, and
what happens when professionals take a back seat to algorithms? This
Part examines regulations on telemedicine and technology-assisted legal
practice as well as pressure to enable cross-border practice in both law
and medicine.
Finally, Part V brings these issues together to discuss
recommendations for how the regulatory landscape should integrate
technological innovations at the same time as it backs away from relying
on direct regulation of technological speech. Although technology went
through a period of extremely rapid change in capability at the turn of the
millennium, both law and medicine were slow to catch up. The COVID-19
pandemic swept away prior resistance to change in medicine and law.
When public health and fundamental justice were on the line, institutions
quickly adapted to encourage virtual medical visits and even online jury
trials. The pandemic will end, but the regulatory structure of both law and
medicine are unlikely to return to their prior status. This Article concludes
with an analysis of how professional regulation can be re-imagined in the
modern era to improve the reliability of legal and medical information while
maintaining an environment of robust and open communication.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT’S GROWING SKEPTICISM OF SPEECH
LIMITATIONS

One of the Roberts Court’s most notable jurisprudential
developments has been its robust protection of First Amendment rights.
The Roberts Court has been described as “the most free-speech-protective

6
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Supreme Court in memory.”4 This protection is especially apparent when
regulatory efforts clash with free-speech claims. In recent years, free
speech advocates have generally prevailed against speech-limiting
regulatory efforts in diverse areas.5
Whether this heightened protection is a good thing or a bad thing
depends on one’s perspective.6 Supporters applaud the Court’s protection
of civil liberties.7 Critics, on the other hand, charge that the Court “has
turned the constitutional protection for free speech into a tool with which
to blow holes in the regulatory state.”8
Traditional regulatory regimes for law and medicine, after all,
regulate speech in many ways. Regulatory regimes determine who can
speak—that is, who is authorized to offer legal or medical advice. They may
also determine to whom professionals can speak—for example, whether
licensed professionals may offer services online to out-of-state clients.
They may determine how professionals speak, especially how they
structure their businesses—that is, can they partner with individuals
outside their profession? Can they be employed by a business entity
funded by outside investors?
This section examines the likely impact of the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence on professional regulation. It first examines the
regulatory landscape within the legal profession and explains how freespeech claims fit into that landscape. Next, it turns to health care,
examining how free-speech challenges intersect with traditional regulatory
authority over medical professionals. Finally, it explores the Supreme
Court’s recent jurisprudence touching on professional regulation,9
including a greater emphasis on free-speech rights in the professional
Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, 25 J.L. &
POL’Y 63, 64 (2016).
5 See, e.g. Janus v. Am. Fedn. of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448 (2018) (striking down public union agency fees); NIFLA, 138 S.Ct. 2361 (striking
down disclosure requirements for crisis pregnancy centers); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564
U.S. 552 (2011) (striking down state restrictions on the sale of prescription data); Citizens
United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down campaign finance
restrictions).
4

6

Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment's Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1241,
1253–54 (2020) (concluding that critics’ problem with the Supreme Court’s heightened
speech protection “was not that it illegitimately sought to vindicate unenumerated rights,
employed overly vague rules of decision, or failed to take adequate account of economic
inequality,” but that “[w]hat they meant instead was that the Court failed to show adequate
deference to the policy judgments of democratically elected legislatures”).
Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment in the Era of President Trump, 94 DENV. L. REV.
553, 557 (2017) (noting that “the Roberts Court has been very protective of speech” by
“expanding who is protected by the First Amendment's safeguarding of expression”).
7

Enrique Armijo, Faint-Hearted First Amendment Lochnerism, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1377, 1380
(2020).
9NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
8
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sphere as well as increasing skepticism of professional practices that
inhibit economic competition.10 It analyzes arguments that the Supreme
Court’s recent jurisprudence undermines regulatory authority in these
areas, questioning how far the Court’s current jurisprudence might go in
limiting traditional areas of regulatory authority over both lawyers and
medical practitioners.

A. Protecting Professionals’ Commercial Speech
Until recently, there were few cases exploring the tension between
professional regulation and free-speech jurisprudence.11 Law and
medicine, as two of the earliest recognized professions, have long been
regulated at the state level through the licensing of professionals.12 In the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the story was one of
regulatory growth: during that period, states adopted licensing and
regulatory regimes for many professions and occupations, often based on
the earlier model originally developed for law and for medicine.13 And
although the Supreme Court struck down some of these early regulatory
efforts, most notably in its Lochner decision, the Court shifted gears in
1937 and later upheld state regulatory efforts under a highly deferential
“reasonable basis” standard.14
It was not until several decades after the end of the Lochner era that
the Supreme Court began striking down regulatory actions on free-speech
grounds.15 These early cases tended to focus on marketing activities,
protecting the rights of labor-union lawyers to offer representation to
injured workers16 and striking down advertising prohibitions on
pharmacies17 and lawyers.18 The Court gave the greatest protection to
speech rights in cases in which “political expression” was at issue—thus
protecting the rights of the NAACP and the ACLU to seek clients in highprofile civil-rights litigation.19
10

North Carolina Bd. of Dental Examiners vs. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015).

Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183,
184 (2014) (noting that "[t]he protection available to occupational speech 'is one of the least
developed areas of First Amendment doctrine.").

11

Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control
Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (2003).
13 Id.
12

14

Armijo, supra note 8.

Nick Robinson, The Multiple Justifications of Occupational Licensing, 93 WASH. L. REV.
1903 (2018).
16 Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
15

Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
18 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
17

19 Natl. Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963)
(stating that “[i]n the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving

8
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When marketing activities arose from a desire for payment rather
than a desire to effect political change, the Court still offered some
protection, though at a lower level of scrutiny. Applying intermediate
scrutiny to commercial speech allowed the Court to uphold some
restrictions, such as limitations on direct personal solicitation of clients.20
In upholding the restriction, the Court noted that the “procurement of
remunerative employment is . . . only marginally affected with First
Amendment concerns,” and that it “falls within the State’s proper sphere
of economic and professional regulation.”21
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that it
may be backing away from its prior dicta that appeared to devalue
commercial speech.22 In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., pharmaceutical
companies challenged a Vermont restriction that barred the sale of
doctors’ prescription data for marketing purposes, although it allowed the
data to be shared for non-commercial uses.23 Vermont argued that the
prohibition regulated conduct, rather than speech, and it asserted that
even if the prohibition did limit speech, the state had an interest in
protecting doctors’ privacy that was sufficient to justify a restriction on
commercial speech.24 The Supreme Court disagreed with the state’s
position and struck down the prohibition.25 It explained that “[t]he
commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life,
provides a forum where ideas and information flourish” and that it was up
to “the speaker and the audience, not the government” to assess the value
of that information.26 The Court suggested that commercial speech
restrictions could be supported when necessary to combat false or
misleading advertising and related marketplace harms but that a state
may not impose regulatory restrictions that burden commercial speech
when the state’s goal is “to tilt public debate in a preferred direction.”27

private differences” but is rather “a form of political expression”); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 434 (1978) (“Where political expression or association is at issue, this Court has not
tolerated the degree of imprecision that often characterizes government regulation of the
conduct of commercial affairs.”).
20

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).

21

Id. at 459.

Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133–206, 196 (2016) (noting that
“the Supreme Court arguably cast a shadow on commercial speech's lower-value status in
Sorrell”).

22

23

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).

24

Id.

25

Id. at 579.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 578-79.

9

55 UC DAVIS L.REV. (forthcoming 2022).

1/1/21

B. Protecting the Content of Professional Speech
The Supreme Court’s early cases largely examined how professionals
attracted business—they did not touch on the scope of professional speech
or regulation once that professional relationship had been established. In
fact, the Court had been so deferential to state regulation that many
observers believed that professional speech was “categorically exempted”
from First Amendment scrutiny once a “personal nexus between
professional and client” had been established.28
The “personal nexus” concept came from a concurrence by Justice
White in Lowe v. Securities Exchange, but was never adopted by the
Supreme Court itself.29 The case arose when the SEC sought to restrain an
individual who was not a registered securities advisor from publishing
newsletters that offered investment advice. Because the Supreme Court
held that the SEC’s enabling act exempted the newsletter from regulation,
it did not have to decide whether the First Amendment would have
protected the newsletter writer. Justice White’s concurrence, however,
delved into the First Amendment principles, concluding that it was
necessary “to locate the point where regulation of a profession leaves off
and prohibitions on speech begin.”30 Justice White drew the line between
advising individual clients and offering general advice to the public at
large—the former type of speech, in his view, was subject to regulation as
the speech was merely incidental to practicing a profession, but the latter
was protected by the First Amendment.31
Even though Justice White’s view was never adopted by a majority
of the Supreme Court, it influenced lower courts, who cited it often in
upholding speech restrictions incidental to professional regulation.32
Under the approach adopted by these lower courts, speech directed
generally at the public would be protected by heightened scrutiny under
the First Amendment, but speech within the confines of a licensed
professional-client relationship could be subject to content-neutral
regulation by the state under a rational-basis standard.33 Under this view,
for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a law that banned sexual orientation
change efforts therapy.34 The court reasoned that because the law
prohibited treatment, not discussions about treatment, it regulated
28

Robinson, supra note 17 at 1930.

Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result); Sherman,
supra note 11, at 185.
30 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232.
29

31

Id.

Sherman, supra note 11, at 187 ("[L]ower courts have generally found Justice White's
test to be satisfied by the existence of any personal nexus between speaker and listener.").
33 See, e.g., Kagan v. City of New Orleans, La., 753 F.3d 560 (2014).
32

Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2014) abrogated by Natl. Inst. of Fam.
and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).

34
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conduct and not speech.35 This speech/conduct distinction follows from
case law developed by district courts and adopted, in some cases, by
courts of appeals.36 According to the court, treatment constitutes conduct
even if it consists entirely of speech, as with psychotherapy.37
The Supreme Court moved away from this deferential approach in
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra.38 The Court in
NIFLA faced a challenge to the Reproductive Freedom, Accountability,
Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (“FACT Act”), which had two
disclosure requirements. First, it required pregnancy centers to distribute
or post a notice informing the public about California’s free and low-cost
reproductive health programs that provided services such as
contraception and abortions.39 Second, it required unlicensed centers to
distribute a notice stating that they were not licensed. A variety of
pregnancy centers challenged the notice as unconstitutional compelled
speech and sought a preliminary injunction against its enforcement.
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held
that both disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment. The Court
criticized decisions from the courts of appeals that “except[ed] professional
speech from the rule that content-based regulations of speech are subject
to strict scrutiny.”40 The Court explained that “this Court has not
recognized ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech.”41 It
stated that professional speech was afforded less protection than other
speech only in “two circumstances”: first, when a law requires
professionals to disclose “factual, noncontroversial information” about the
services they provide and second, when a regulation of conduct
“incidentally involves” speech.42

35

Id. at 1230.

36

See Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman, The Future of Physicians' First Amendment
Freedom: Professional Speech in an Era of Radically Expanded Prenatal Genetic Testing, 76
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577, 653 (2019) (“The lower courts have repeatedly approached the
problem of identifying professional speech by attempting to differentiate “medical conduct”
from physician speech.”).
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (“[A] regulation of only treatment itself—whether physical
medicine or mental health treatment—implicates free speech interests only incidentally, if
at all”).
37

NIFLA, 138 S.Ct. at 2361; See Rodney A. Smolla, Commercial Speech in Specific
Contexts—Commercial Speech and Professional Services—Regulation of ‘Professional
Speech’, 2 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 20:37.40 (2020) (“The Supreme Court
largely obliterated the nascent professional speech doctrine in National Institute of Family
& Life Advocates v. Becerra.”).

38

39

NIFLA, 138 S.Ct. at 2369.

40Id.

at 2371.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 2372.
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The Court concluded that neither of those circumstances applied to
the California law.43 It explained that the notice about state-based low-cost
health programs “in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics
provide,” but instead informed clients about other services provided by the
state.44 Furthermore, the requirement more than “incidentally” involved
speech—its very purpose was communication.45
The disclosure of licensure status came closer to qualifying for
deferential treatment as a factual, noncontroversial statement about
services provided, but the Court concluded that even if the more
deferential standard applied, the disclosure requirement would still fail for
being unduly burdensome.46 The Court held that the state had the burden
of proof to establish that the licensing disclosure was “neither unjustified
nor unduly burdensome.”47 To do so, it would have to show an alleged
harm that is “potentially real and not purely hypothetical,” and a
disclosure requirement that extends “no broader than reasonably
necessary” to avoid “chilling protected speech.”48 The Court concluded that
the state had failed to establish more than hypothetical harms and had
failed to tailor the disclosure requirement, stating that the law “targets
speakers, not speech, and imposes an unduly burdensome disclosure
requirement that will chill their protected speech.”49
The Supreme Court’s NIFLA decision surprised many onlookers.
Constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky believed that it would be
easy for the Supreme Court to uphold the law.50 After all, “traditionally,
warnings and disclosures had not drawn constitutional attacks.”51 The
Court’s decision suggests that lower courts’ interpretation of law will need
substantial rethinking. In particular, the speech/conduct distinction is
unlikely to play a dispositive role in future cases, even when there is a
“personal nexus” between a licensed professional and an individual client
or patient. As one scholar explained, “although the Court has upheld
regulations of professional conduct that incidentally involved speech, it
does not automatically assume that regulations that apply to professionals
43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 2373-74.

46

Id. at 2378.

47

Id. at 2377.

48

Id. at 2377-78.

49

Id. at 2378.

Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: Ensuring Accurate Information for Patients Does Not
Violate the First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 12, 2017, 1:35 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/12/symposium-ensuring-accurate-informationpatients-not-violate-first-amendment/.
50

Andra Lim, Limiting NIFLA, 72 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (2020) (“traditionally, warnings and
disclosures had not drawn constitutional attacks.”).
51
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are always regulations of conduct.”52 He pointed out that the plaintiffs
themselves in NIFLA provided both advice and pregnancy-related medical
services, and that “[t]he mere fact that the plaintiffs were licensed
professionals did not render all of their advice regulable conduct.”53
Instead, the Court recognized that the First Amendment protects the
content of licensed professionals’ speech.

C. Protecting the
Regulation

Marketplace

against

Anti-Competitive

Along with protecting commercial and professional speech, the
Supreme Court has also recently limited the power of some licensing
boards to use their licensing power to control the speech of non-licensed
individuals. In North Carolina, the state dental board challenged
individuals who operated teeth-whitening kiosks in shopping malls,
alleging that they were practicing dentistry without a license.54 The Federal
Trade Commission filed an administrative complaint, arguing that the
board’s decision “constituted an anticompetitive and unfair method of
competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act.”55 The board
claimed immunity from antitrust regulation as a state entity, and further
argued that the state had delegated power to the board to regulate matters
affecting public safety.56
When the dispute reached the Supreme Court, the Court sided with
the FTC. It concluded that the dental board was not immune from
antitrust liability because it was controlled by “market participants.”57 The
Court explained that a “nonsovereign actor controlled by active market
participants” would qualify for immunity only if it met two requirements:
first, that the restraint of trade “be one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy,” and second, that it “be actively supervised by
the State.”58 The Court found that the policy of prohibiting the
unauthorized practice of dentistry was clearly established, but that the
inclusion of teeth-whitening as “dentistry” was less clear. Nor was there
any state involvement in the decision to categorize teeth-whitening as
dentistry—that decision was made by the board, a majority of which
consisted of practicing dentists.59 The domination of the regulatory board

Michael E. Rosman, Is It Time to Revisit the Constitutionality of Unauthorized Practice of
Law Rules?, 20 FEDERALIST SOC'Y REV. 74, 78 (2019).
53 Id.
52

54

N. Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 574 U.S. 494 (2015).

55

Id. at 501.

56

Id.; see also id. at 522 (Alito, J., dissenting).

57

Id. at 504.

58

Id.

59

Id.
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by market participants, the Court stated, created a “risk that active market
participants will pursue private interests in restraining trade.”60
Although the Supreme Court’s decision was not based expressly on a
free-speech rationale, the decision will still reshape state regulatory
authority of matters involving professional speech. A licensing regime,
after all, is a means of “essentially granting ‘speech monopolies’” to those
it licenses.61 Licensing practices identify a “class of speakers who may
engage in certain forms of communication,” thereby “entrench[ing] the
power of those speakers” in relation to those who lack such statesanctioned authority.62 Thus, by limiting the power of practitionerdominated state boards to engage in protectionist activity, the Supreme
Court was protecting the free-speech rights of unlicensed individuals.63 As
with the Court’s other cases, however, the decision meant that
professional regulatory bodies would be given less deference.
In some ways, this decision may risk undermining the goals of
professional regulation. Professor Claudia Haupt, who has written
extensively about professional speech, has argued that the professions
should be thought of as “knowledge communities.”64 She points out that
state regulations that limit or control the content of professional speech
may be more defensible if those restrictions depend on the professional
judgment of the American Medical Association or equivalent entities.65
Increased participation of political entities, in her view, “should result in a
high degree of skepticism toward state interference at odds with
professional insights.”66
Even so, one of the likely results of the North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners case is greater political oversight over state professional boards.
From the beginning, it was clear that the case would affect professional
regulation beyond dentistry. At oral argument, Justice Breyer raised the
question of whether a decision in favor of the FTC could affect medical
credentialing and expressed concern that “neurologists, not non-physician
state regulators,” be allowed “to decide who can be a neurologist.”67
60

Id. at 510.

Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth": Professional Licensing and the First Amendment,
23 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 885, 974 (2000).
62 Id.
61

63 Armijo, supra note 8, at 1420–21 (“When the state has the power to revoke an
occupational license for a speech-related reason and the grounds for revocation are subject
to a lesser standard of constitutional review, the government grants itself the speech-hostile
. . . power to ban individuals from the occupations of their choice based on what they say.”).

Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE L.J.
FORUM 150, 171 (2017).
65 Id.
64

66

Id.

Eric M. Fraser, Argument Analysis: Court Wary of Immunity for Licensing Boards, but
(Oct.
15,
2014,
12:29
PM),
What
About
Doctors?,
SCOTUSBLOG
67
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Although Justice Breyer ultimately joined the majority decision, his
concern was not unwarranted—commentators have noted that
“neurologists and other doctors are just as capable of anticompetitive
actions as are dentists.”68 The opinion does not carve out an exception for
regulations resting on specialized medical knowledge.
The Dental Examiners opinion has influenced legal regulation as well.
LegalZoom, a company that helps customers “create their own legal
documents addressing a variety of routine legal matters” joined with other
legal services providers and law professors to file an amicus brief in
support of the FTC.69 LegalZoom explained that it had also “been subject
to anticompetitive actions taken by self- and financially-interested
regulatory agencies controlled by private market participants that have
threatened to restrict the market choices available to consumers,”
including in the state of North Carolina. After the Supreme Court ruled for
the FTC, LegalZoom managed to reach a favorable settlement with
regulators.70
In the five years after the Supreme Court’s decision, there has been “a
wave of private action suits against various state occupational licensing
authorities.”71 One of those cases involved a Texas restriction on
telemedicine treatment.72 The federal district court relied on the Supreme
Court’s Dental Examiners decision to conclude that the plaintiffs had
successfully set out a prima facie case showing that their antitrust claim
would likely succeed. The district court therefore granted an injunction
against the regulation.73 The state regulatory board “later dropped its
appeal, seemingly fearing that the circuit court would rule that the
regulation did not have state action immunity.”74

https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/argument-analysis-court-wary-of-immunity-forlicensing-boards-but-what-about-doctors/.
68

Id.

Brief of Legalzoom.com, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, N. Carolina
State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C, 574 U.S. 494 (2015), 2014 WL 3895926 (2014).
70 Keith A. Call, Could Our "Ethics" Actually Be Illegal?, 29 UTAH B.J. 34 (May/June 2016)
(noting that a suit filed in the wake of the Dental Examiners case “resulted in a consent
decree that allows LegalZoom to provide certain types of legal services in North Carolina,
subject to certain consumer protection measures”); Caroline Shipman, Unauthorized
Practice of Law Claims Against Legalzoom--Who Do These Lawsuits Protect, and Is the Rule
Outdated?, 32 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 939, 947 (2019) (noting the North Carolina Legislature
also passed a bill setting parameters similar to those of the settlement).
69

71

Robinson, supra note15.

72

Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 112 F. Supp. 3d 529 (W.D. Tex. 2015).

73

Id.

74

Robinson, supra note 15.
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PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH

The Court’s speech jurisprudence is new enough that it’s too soon
to tell just how far it will go in limiting regulation in traditional professional
spheres like law and medicine. But the Court’s recent decisions raise
significant questions that continue to spawn a great deal of litigation likely
to affect the regulatory landscape in both medicine and law. This section
examines the most significant of those ongoing challenges in law and
health care and analyzes what the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence might
mean for traditional regulatory actions in these areas of professional
practice.

A. The Free Speech Landscape in Legal Practice
At its core, the regulation of legal practice is the regulation of
speech.75 The practice of law, in fact, is only speech—while many doctors
may perform surgery or other physical procedures on patients, lawyers do
not. Historically, the regulation of legal practice has centered on two areas.
First is the question of who can speak—that is, how does the state license
individual practitioners and how does it stop non-licensed individuals from
encroaching on areas carved out for licensed attorneys? The second area
of regulatory tension relates to what can be said, especially for the purpose
of marketing legal services.
The last twenty years have seen major change in some aspects of
lawyer regulation and growing frustration at the lack of change in other
areas. States have offered greater uniformity and reciprocity in licensing,
making law degrees more geographically portable than in prior decades.76
At the same time, regulatory changes have failed to improve access to legal
services, creating growing dissatisfaction with the unavailability of legal
services to even middle-class individuals and small businesses.77
A few states have voluntarily begun to experiment with loosening
regulatory structures in order to promote access to justice. The state of
Washington was one of the first to license non-lawyer professionals to
undertake some tasks historically reserved for lawyers, but the state
abandoned the program when costs appeared to outweigh the program’s
See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1302-03 (2016) (noting
that many professions are based in speech, and that “[i]t is therefore all the more troubling
that there has not yet been a comprehensive theory of professional speech advanced in the
courts and the legal literature.”).
75

Robert J. Derocher, Breaking Barriers: In a Changing Profession, What Is the Impact of
the
Uniform Bar
Examination?,
ABA
Bar
Leader
(Sept.-Oct.
2019),
at
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_leader/2019_20/s
eptember-october/breaking-barriers-in-a-changing-profession-what-is-the-impact-of-theuniform-bar-examination/.
76

Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook Disruption: How Social Media May Transform
Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 75–98 (2012).
77
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benefit.78 Other states have taken a much more radical approach. The Utah
Supreme Court adopted a “sandbox” program to pilot “new and innovative
legal business models and services.”79 And Arizona has gone the furthest,
enacting a wholesale change in late August 2020 that “has gotten rid of
two of what many consider the main pillars of our professional
independence: the rule against fee-splitting with non-lawyers and the rule
against paid-for recommendations.”80
Most of the states, however, continue to maintain traditional
regulatory structures. These states are increasingly facing legal
challenges, often based on free speech grounds. In recent years, litigation
has challenged licensing restrictions that prohibit non-lawyers from
offering legal advice, prohibitions on non-lawyer ownership of law firms,
and restrictions on marketing and commercial speech.
1. Licensure
In general, states have taken a harder line on “unauthorized practice”
rules in law (known as “UPL”) than in medicine. In medicine, most
unauthorized practice prosecutions focus on individuals who falsely hold
themselves out to be licensed professionals. Although legal practice also
has such cases, there are also many cases involving individuals who were
honest about their status as non-lawyers.81 Before the 1980s, there had
been “surprisingly few constitutional challenges to unauthorized practice
prohibitions.”82 In fact, a study by Professor Deborah Rhode identified only
ten reported decisions considering First Amendment claims at all.83
Some of the earliest free-speech challenges to lawyer regulation
occurred when state bars tried to limit assistance to individuals engaged
in self-help legal practice. Texas famously prosecuted a legal publisher for
printing forms intended to be used by pro se litigants.84 More recently, state
bars have gone after online service providers such as LegalZoom.85 In
Lyle Moran, How the Washington Supreme Court's LLLT Program Met Its Demise, ABA J.,
July 9, 2020.
79
Utah
Supreme
Court,
The
Office
of
Legal
Services
Innovation,
https://sandbox.utcourts.gov/.
80 Ron Minkoff, Arizona's Sweeping Rule Changes Permit More Non-Lawyer Involvement in
Legal Services, FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN & SELZ PC PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY LAW BLOG
(Sept. 9, 2020), https://professionalresponsibility.fkks.com/post/102ge8x/arizonassweeping-rule-changes-permit-more-non-lawyer-involvement-in-legal-servi.
78

Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1981) (finding that a
minority of unauthorized practice claims “concerned laymen fraudulently holding
themselves out as attorneys”).
81

82

Id. at 44.

83

Id.

84

In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999).

85 Catherine J. Lanctot, Does Legal Zoom Have First Amendment Rights? Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
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recent years, the number of such challenges has grown—though appellate
courts have “uniformly rejected such challenges . . . based on a wide
variety of unconvincing rationales,” such as the idea that nonlawyers’ legal
advice is conduct rather than speech, or that if legal advice is speech, it is
merely “incidental” to conduct.86
Yet as the free-speech challenges in this area grow, courts are
increasingly having to grapple with questions about whether their
precedent is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent protection of
professional speech. Ohio case law offers a recent example of this tension.
Ohio has taken an explicitly “expansive” position.87 Cincinnati B. Assn. v.
Foreclosure Sols involved a complaint against advisors who helped families
try to avoid foreclosure on their homes. In enjoining the conduct and
imposing penalties on the defendants, the court held that efforts to “advise
[others] of their legal rights,” can qualify as the unauthorized practice of
law.88 Under the court’s holding, it did not matter whether the advisors
held themselves out as attorneys; the court stated that “laypersons may
not insulate themselves . . . by simply informing customers facing
foreclosure that the layperson is not an attorney and is, therefore,
incapable of giving legal advice.”89 Unfortunately, this Ohio case did not
grapple directly with potential First Amendment defenses to the UPL claim;
the issue may not have been raised by the defendants. The Ohio Attorney
General did file an amicus brief urging the court to adopt a “carefully
crafted” definition of the practice of law, warning the court that an overly
broad standard could “easily, although inadvertently, sweep into their
ambit the many legitimate housing counselors who provide vital and
valuable loss-mitigation and foreclosure prevention counseling in Ohio.”90
While that case didn’t directly address free-speech claims, two
justices on the Ohio Supreme Court have signaled a willingness to
reconsider the court’s earlier precedents on First Amendment grounds.
Justice Patrick DeWine, joined by Justice Sharon Kennedy dissented when
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a UPL charge based on an individual’s
action taken to help a church avoid foreclosure.91 The facts show that the
individual had taken three actions on behalf of the church: he (1) “advised
REV. 255, 262 (2011); Mathew Rotenberg, Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of Law
and Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 725 (2012).
Michele Cotton, Improving Access to Justice by Enforcing the Free Speech Clause, 83
BROOK. L. REV. 111, 155 (2017).
87 Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Foreclosure Sols., L.L.C., 914 N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ohio 2009) (“We
have defined the practice of law expansively.”).
86

88

Id. at 390.

89

Id.

90 Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Foreclosure Sols., L.L.C., 914 N.E.2d 386 (Ohio 2009), 2009 WL
1939104 (June 25, 2009).
91

Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Watkins Glob. Network, 150 N.E.3d 68 (Ohio 2020).
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the church to try to ‘find a solution before [the matter got] out of hand’ and
suggested that it ‘try to raise the needed funds’ and accept a settlement
offer from PNC Bank” (2) he “apparently indicated to the bank's attorney
that the bank should ‘mediate’ rather than litigate the dispute,” and (3) he
“may have expressed to the bank's attorney that he didn't believe that the
church should owe on the debt.”92 None of this advice was clearly wrong,
and the defendant had never purported to be acting as an attorney. Even
so, the court found this evidence strong enough to support a $1,000 fine
and an injunction against further action.
In his dissent, Justice DeWine wrote that “merely expressing an
opinion with legal implications is not the practice of law,” and that “a
corollary of the principle that one doesn't violate our rules merely by
voicing an opinion with legal implications is that one doesn't violate our
rules just because one offers such an opinion in the course of providing
another service to a client.”93 DeWine pointed to the Supreme Court’s
decision in NIFLA to explain that “[o]ur authority to regulate the practice
of law is further limited by the associational and free-speech rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”94
Justice DeWine also noted that “the Ohio State Bar Association, a
professional association of lawyers, is acting as the prosecutor in this case”
and cited the Dental Examiners case for the proposition that the Supreme
Court had recently held that regulatory schemes relying on “active market
participants” may violate antitrust law.95
2. Outside Investment in Law Practice
Most states retain restrictions on the “corporate practice of law”—that
is, allowing nonlawyers to invest in law practices or to own law firms.
Professor Renee Knake Jefferson has argued that corporate practice
restrictions violate the First Amendment. She asserts that “commercial
speech about the delivery of legal services is inherently political speech,
speech that goes to the heart of meaningful access to the law, speech
deserving of the strongest protection that the Constitution offers.” She
therefore believes that bans on external investment necessarily “function
as content regulation that suppresses ideas.”96 The law firm of Jacoby and
Meyers, LLP has made similar arguments challenging the corporate
practice doctrine in court; it sued in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut, arguing that the ban on investment violates the firm’s

92

Id. at 80 (DeWine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

93

Id. at 78 (DeWine, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Id. at 79 citing Natl. Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.Ct. 2361, 23712372, (2018).
95 Id. at 79.
94

Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,
36 (2012).
96
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constitutional rights.97 The law firm lost its challenges in New York and
Connecticut and voluntarily dismissed its New Jersey case.98 Even so, the
underlying constitutional issues are likely to be picked up by others
making similar claims in the future.
3. Marketing and Commercial Speech
Protection for commercial speech continues to be a source of
tension in legal regulation. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which form the basis of most states’ rules, now prohibit only “false or
misleading communication” in advertising claims.99 Even under the more
relaxed modern regulatory scheme, however, there is plenty of room for
disagreement about the allowable scope of attorney speech. For example,
states may take a hard line in defining what is “misleading.” In one recent
case, an advertisement was held to be misleading when it “featured a
relatively comic and innocuous fictional vignette in which an insurance
company is depicted as capitulating and settling its case upon learning
the identity of the plaintiff’s personal injury firm.”100 Of course, there is
room for judicial interpretation in deciding what constitutes a “misleading”
communication. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s decision in NIFLA
suggests that restrictive decisions are vulnerable if they rely merely on
“hypothetical” harms.101 Without evidence that a reasonable client is likely
to be misled by such an advertisement, the prohibition should fail.
Attorney speech that falls in the gray area between “commercial”
and “political” speech is sometimes subject to challenge. The Virginia
Supreme Court was sharply divided when one attorney was charged with
a disciplinary violation for failing to label his blog posts, which discussed
criminal justice issues, as “advertisements.” Ultimately the court upheld
the labeling requirement, concluding that the attorney used his blog as a
way to generate client interest and that the state could therefore compel
him to label the posts.102 Two dissenting justices, however, would have held
differently; they argued that “[w]hen commercial and political elements are
intertwined in speech, the heightened scrutiny test must apply to all of the
speech.”103 The case was decided several years before the Supreme Court’s

97 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Private Ordering in the Market for Professional Services, 94
B.U. L. REV. 179, 191 (2014).
98 Charles Toutant, Jacoby & Meyers Drops Bid for Nonlawyer Equity Stake, N.J. L. J. (July
29, 2014); Mark Dubois, Jacoby & Meyers Case-Not Only Unsuccessful but Moot, Too, CONN.
L. TRIB. (March 27, 2017).
99 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
100

Rodney A. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002).

101

Natl. Inst. of Fam. and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018).

Hunter v. Virginia State Bar ex rel. Third Dist. Comm., 744 S.E.2d 611, 620 (Va. 2013)
(“Hunter's blogs are commercial speech and, thus, constitute lawyer advertising.”).
103 Id. at 623 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
102
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NIFLA decision, and if the situation arose now, the attorney’s case against
compelled disclosure would be even stronger.

B. The Free Speech Landscape in Health Care
In many ways, medicine is regulated far more extensively than
law. For example, while plaintiffs can litigate pro se,105 patients cannot
write their own prescriptions.106 Whereas legal practice is largely selfregulated, the practice of medicine is subject to constraints imposed by
both state and federal legislatures and administrative agencies.107 The
plethora of health care regulations have generated a profusion of litigation,
including First Amendment free speech claims.108 The number and variety
of such claims in medicine far exceeds the scope of litigation over
professional speech in the legal field.
104

While the Supreme Court has consistently trended towards favoring
free speech rights, the lower courts have been less consistent in health
care professional conduct cases. Predictions are especially difficult to
make when litigation is driven by political agendas, such as a desire to
impede abortions or medical marijuana.109 Below is a sampling of cases in
which medical professionals have asserted freedom of speech claims.
Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal
Profession? 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 461-465 (2008) (arguing that lawyers are the only selfregulated profession and are therefore less regulated than other professions, like medicine,
because those professions are subject to control by legislatures whereas the legal
profession answers to and is regulated by itself); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions are
Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 713, 714-715 (1999) (discussing the change in the medical profession from selfregulation to corporate and institutional regulation and comparing it to the legal profession
which still functions as a self-regulated profession and is therefore less regulated than the
medical industry).
104

United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, Pro Se Litigants / Representing
Yourself, http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/general/prose-litigants.htm (last visited January
9, 2021).
106 Washington State Department of Health, Who Can Prescribe and Administer Prescriptions
in
Washington
State,
https://www.doh.wa.gov/LicensesPermitsandCertificates/ProfessionsNewReneworUpdate
/PharmacyCommission/WhoCanPrescribeandAdministerPrescriptions
(last
visited
January 9, 2021).
107 Barton, supra note 104, at 461-65; Medscape, Key Regulations Affecting a Physician's
Practice, https://www.medscape.com/courses/section/870050 (last visited January 2,
2021) (asserting that “[h]ealthcare is one of the most regulated industries in the United
States” and that the “list of regulations and acts that affect the management of a physician's
office is daunting”).
105

See generally, Jessica Clara Schidlow, Prescribing Politics: A Call for Stronger First
Amendment Protection of Physician-Patient Communications from State Interference in the
Practice
of
Medicine,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(Sept.
12,
2016),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/prescribing-politics-call-stronger-firstamendment-protection-physician-patient.
108

109
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in A Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. REV. 739,
763 (2018) (explaining that both the country and the judiciary have grown increasingly
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1. Licensure
Like lawyers, health care professionals generally must have
appropriate licenses from each state in which they practice.110 Licensing
requirements have generated several lawsuits.
To illustrate, in Hines v. Quillivan,111 a veterinarian alleged that a
Texas statute that prohibited the practice of veterinary medicine by phone
and absent a valid veterinarian-client-patient relationship violated his
First (and Fourteenth) Amendment rights.112 The district court found that
the law was content-neutral and ruled against Dr. Hines.113 However, the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case in light of NIFLA and related
cases, instructing the district court to assess whether the statute
regulated conduct or speech.114
In Rosemond v. Markham, the author of a long-running newspaper
parenting advice column sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging
that the Kentucky Board of Examiners of Psychology's effort to prohibit
him from calling himself as a “family psychologist” violated his First
Amendment free speech rights.115 The court held that Board's attempted
regulation of the plaintiff’s tagline at the bottom of his advice column was
a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny, which it did not
survive.116 More specifically, the court asserted:
Rosemond is entitled to express his views and the fact that he is not
a Kentucky-licensed psychologist does not change that fact. If the
facts were different, had Rosemond represented himself to be a
Kentucky-licensed psychologist or had he actually entered into a
client-patient relationship in Kentucky, the outcome might be
different.117
politically polarized, but noting that “political bias is especially hard to pin down” in judicial
rulings when there is no clear line between judicial ideology and interpretation).
Robert Kocher, Doctors Without State Borders: Practicing Across State Lines, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG
(Feb.
18,
2014),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140218.036973/full/;
Washington
State
Department
of
Health,
License
Requirements,
https://www.doh.wa.gov/LicensesPermitsandCertificates/ProfessionsNewReneworUpdate
/HealthcareProfessionalCredentialingRequirements (last visited July 16, 2020). See e.g.,
OH REV. CODE § 4731.41(A) (2019) (“No person shall practice medicine and surgery, or any
of its branches, without the appropriate license or certificate from the state medical board
to engage in the practice.”).
110

111

Hines v. Quillivan, 395 F.Supp.3d 857, 860 (2019).

112

Id.

113

Id. at 864-66.

114

Hines v. Quillivan, 982 F.3d 266, 272 (2020).

115

Rosemond v. Markham, 135 F. Supp. 3d 574, 578 (E.D. Ky. 2015).

116

Id. at 586, 589.

117

Id. at 589.
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This outcome is markedly different from that of Cincinnati B. Assn. v.
Foreclosure Sols, discussed above.118 Faced with similar claims related to
legal advice, an Ohio court prohibited nonlawyers from helping families
facing foreclosure and imposed penalties on them for doing so.
A Georgia licensing case involved the regulation of midwifery.119
Deborah Pulley, who worked as a certified professional midwife for forty
years and delivered over one-thousand babies, asserted that a Georgia
statute prohibiting individuals from calling themselves midwives unless
they had a nursing degree violated her free speech rights.120 The case
quickly settled, and the state agreed not to pursue cases against midwives
such as Ms. Pulley in the future.121
2. Compelled Speech and Forbidden Topics
Many professional speech cases have arisen in health care because
states attempted to force practitioners to make certain statements or
prohibited them from engaging in particular forms of speech. Below are a
number of examples.
Conversion Therapy
Twenty states have passed laws prohibiting therapists from
practicing conversion therapy122 on gay minors.123 When opponents
challenged those laws in the Third Circuit and Ninth Circuits before NIFLA,
the courts upheld the legislation.124 The Third Circuit applied intermediate

118

See text associated with notes 87-90.

Jim Manley & Caleb Trotter, Call the Midwife — but Not if You Live in Georgia, THE HILL
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/474216-call-the-midwife-butnot-if-you-live-in-georgia.
120 Id.; Pulley v. Izlar, No. 1:19-cv-05574, (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2019), available at
https://pacificlegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Debbie-Pulley-v.-Janice-IzlarComplaint.pdf.
121 Pulley v. Thompson, No. 1:19-cv-05574-AT, Consent Order and Final Judgment, (N.D.
Ga.
Jul.
8,
2020),
available
at
https://pacificlegal.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/Pulley-v.-Thompson-Consent-Order-Final-Judgment.pdf
(“Defendant agrees that the Board will only pursue cases involving the unlicensed practice
of nursing (including midwifery) in Georgia for cases involving unlicensed individuals
unlawfully practicing midwifery or holding themselves out to the public as being able to
practice nursing (midwifery) lawfully in the State of Georgia.”).
119

Conversion therapy aims to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity, and
many consider it to be discredited and harmful. See The Trevor Project, About Conversion
Therapy,
https://www.thetrevorproject.org/get-involved/trevor-advocacy/50-bills-50states/about-conversion-therapy/ (last visited January 2, 2021).
123
Family
Equality,
Conversion
Therapy
Laws,
https://www.familyequality.org/resources/conversion-therapy-laws/ (last visited July 14,
2020).
124 King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3rd Cir. 2014) overruled in part by NIFLA, 138
S.Ct. at 2371-2372 (noting that SCOTUS has not recognized “professional speech” as a
separate category of speech and stating that speech is not unprotected by the First
122
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scrutiny and reasoned that the law was defensible under the First
Amendment because it advanced the state’s interest of protecting children
from harm.125 The Ninth Circuit upheld the conversion therapy ban under
a rational basis analysis, reasoning that the law pertained to medical
conduct rather than speech.126 Notably, in a very recent post-NIFLA
decision, the Eleventh Circuit subjected a conversion therapy ban to strict
scrutiny as a content-based regulation and found that it violated the First
Amendment.127
Medical Marijuana
Medical marijuana is legal in many states,128 but doctors who
prescribe it or advise patients to use it may risk disciplinary action by
federal authorities, arguably in contravention of their free speech rights.129
The Ninth Circuit considered a federal policy that established in relevant
part that a doctor’s recommendation of medical marijuana would lead to
revocation of his or her registration to prescribe controlled substances.130
The court found that the content-based restriction impermissibly
interfered with the free speech rights of physicians.131 By contrast, at least
one district court held that the First Amendment does not protect
physician speech surrounding the prescription and recommendation of
medicinal marijuana.132
Gun Possession
In Florida, physicians and medical organizations challenged a law
that barred doctors and other medical professionals from asking about
firearm ownership or entering details regarding firearm ownership in a
patient’s medical chart.133 The Eleventh Circuit found that the contentAmendment just because it is spoken by professionals); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208
(9th Cir. 2014).
125

King, 767 F.3d at 237-39.

126

Pickup, 740 F.3d. at 1230.

127

Otto v. City of Boca Raton, Florida, 981 F.3d 854, 867-68, 872 (11th Cir. 2020). But see
Doyle v. Hogan, 411 F.Supp.3d 337, 344-48 (D. MD. 2019) (applying intermediate scrutiny
to uphold Maryland’s statutory ban of conversion therapy and dismiss a practitioner’s First
Amendment claim).
DISA Global Solutions, Map of Marijuana Legality by State, https://disa.com/map-ofmarijuana-legality-by-state (last updated Nov. 4, 2020).
129 Joseph Gregorio, Physicians, Medical Marijuana, and the Law, 16 AMA J. ETHICS 732,
733 (2014); Marijuana Policy Project, “Prescribing” Versus “Recommending” Medical
Cannabis, MPP.ORG https://www.mpp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Prescribingvs.-Recommending.pdf (last visited January 9, 2021).
130 Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2002).
128

131

Id. at 639.

132

Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.C. Dist. 2001).

Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Florida’s
Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act (FOPA), codified at Fla. Stat. §§ 790.338, 456.072, 395.1055
& 381.026 (2011).
133
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based law failed to withstand both intermediate and strict scrutiny and
thus violated plaintiffs’ free speech rights.134
Abortion
Not surprisingly, some of the most vigorous First Amendment
battles relate to speech about reproductive rights. Likely because of the
politically charged nature of these cases, court decisions show no
consistent pattern.
For example, in recent years, Arkansas135, Idaho136, Kentucky137,
North Dakota,138 South Dakota139, Oklahoma,140 Nebraska141, and Utah142
passed laws requiring physicians to tell women that medication abortions
(using pills) can be reversed, through use of the hormone progesterone
even though this claim is not supported by scientific evidence.143 Courts
have temporarily enjoined enforcement of the laws in North Dakota and
Oklahoma.144
Other states (fourteen in total) enacted laws mandating that
clinicians conduct ultrasounds before performing abortions.145 Kentucky’s
law, requiring that doctors perform an ultrasound and show and describe
fetal images to a woman prior to an abortion, has been vigorously

Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1311 (“Because these provisions fail to satisfy heightened
scrutiny under Sorrell, they obviously would not withstand strict scrutiny.”).
134
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20-16-1703(b) ARK. CODE R. § 9(A).
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CODE § 18-609(2)(f).
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KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.774(2)
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N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(11)(b)(5).
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KS.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(h).
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63 OKLA. STAT. § 1-756 (B).
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NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-327 (1)(e).

142

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305.5 (2)(u).

Anna North, Pregnant People are Being Offered an Unproven Treatment to “Reverse”
Abortions, VOX, https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/11/11/20953337/abortion-pillreversal-ohio-bill-law-pregnancy (updated Dec. 6, 2019).
144 AMA v. Stenehjem, 412 F.Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Dist. 2019) (granting preliminary
injunction to prevent the enforcement of a state law requiring doctors to inform patients
that the effect of an abortion-inducing drug can be reversed); Tulsa Women’s Reproductive
Clinic v. Hunter, No. CV-2019-2176 (Okla. Dist. Ct., Okla. County Oct. 29, 2019), available
at https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=oklahoma&number=CV2019-2176&cmid=3813709 (granting a temporary restraining order preventing the
Oklahoma Attorney General from enforcing the state’s abortion-reversal disclosure law).
145
Guttmacher
Institute,
Requirements
for
Ultrasound,
GUTMMACHER.ORG,
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound (current as
of Dec. 1, 2020).
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litigated.146 A federal court of appeals upheld the law, and the Supreme
Court declined to hear the case.147
South Dakota requires physicians to tell patients, in writing and in
person, that among the known risks of abortion are an increased likelihood
of depression, suicidal ideation and suicide.148 Mississippi and Texas
mandate that doctors advise women that abortions are associated with an
increased risk of breast cancer.149 Although many experts agree that no
credible evidence supports any of these claims,150 the Eighth Circuit upheld
South Dakota’s law.151
3. FDA Regulation of Non-Clinicians
Not all First Amendment controversies involve health care
clinicians. Some have involved entities and professional activities that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates, and they merit brief
mention here.152 The FDA regulates drugs, medical devices, and biological
products.153 The scope of regulation includes matters of professional
speech, such as drug labeling and advertising.154
Physicians may prescribe drugs for purposes that the agency has
not approved, a practice known as off-label use.155 Traditionally, however,
the FDA has prohibited manufacturers from promoting their drugs for off146

KY. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 311.727 (2020).

EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 2019) cert.
denied, EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Meier, 140 S.Ct. 655 (2019). The court
explained that:
147

Under the First Amendment, we will not highly scrutinize an informed-consent
statute, including one involving informed consent to an abortion, so long as it
meets these three requirements: (1) it must relate to a medical procedure; (2) it
must be truthful and not misleading; and (3) it must be relevant to the patient's
decision whether to undertake the procedure, which may include, in the abortion
context, information relevant to the woman's health risks, as well as the impact on
the unborn life.
Id. at 428-29.
148

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(e)(i)-(ii) (West 2016).

MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii) (West 2017); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
171.012(a)(1)(B)(iii) (West 2015).
150 Sarah Kramer, Not Your Mouthpiece: Abortion, Ideology, and Compelled Speech in
Physician-Patient Relationships, 21 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 3-4 (2018).
149

Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding no First
Amendment violation because a state could “require a physician to provide truthful, nonmisleading information relevant to a patient's decision to have an abortion”).
151

U.S. Food & Drug Administration, About FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda (last
visited January 2, 2021).
153 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, What We Do, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/whatwe-do (current as of Mar. 28, 2018).
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Kapczynski, supra note 3, at 180, 185.
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Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 724-25 (2017).
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label uses.156 Industry advocates have objected that this constraint violates
manufacturers’ First Amendment rights.157 Following in the footsteps of
Sorrell, at least a few courts have shown sympathy for this argument.
In United States v. Caronia, the government prosecuted a drug
company detailer for promoting a drug approved for narcolepsy for off-label
uses, including restless leg syndrome, insomnia, and other conditions.158
The Second Circuit ruled that prosecuting individuals for off-label drug
promotion violated their First Amendment rights, though the FDA could
still prohibit companies from making false and misleading statements.159
Likewise, in Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, a Southern District of New York
judge granted a company preliminary relief on First Amendment grounds,
allowing it to market a drug called Vascepa for off-label use..160
The FDA also regulates certain medical mobile applications and
digital services.161 One example is 23andMe, which analyzes customers’
genetic material (a saliva sample), and provides them with information
about their ancestry, health, and disease vulnerability.162 Such products
are often called direct-to-consumer (DTC) tests163 Critics posit that
regulation of medical mobile applications violates First Amendment free
Elizabeth Richardson, Off-Label Drug Promotion. Drug Companies Are Largely Prohibited
from Promoting a Drug for Uses That Have Not Been Approved by the Food and Drug
Administration,
HEALTH
POLICY
BRIEF
(June
30,
2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20160630.920075/full/healthpolicybrief
_159.pdf.
157 Id. at 4; Peter J. Henning, F.D.A.’s ‘Off-Label’ Drug Policy Leads to Free-Speech Fight,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
10,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/business/dealbook/fdas-off-label-drug-policyleads-to-free-speech-fight.html.
156

158

U.S. v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 156 (2nd Cir. 2012).
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Id. at 160, 168.
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Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F.Supp.3d 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y
2015) (granting the company’s motion for a preliminary injunction and declaring that
certain marketing statements were truthful and not misleading, despite the FDA’s
objections).
U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Device Software Functions Including Mobile Medical
Applications (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/devicesoftware-functions-including-mobile-medical-applications.
162 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer
Tests that Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-allows-marketing-firstdirect-consumer-tests-provide-genetic-risk-information-certain-conditions;
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Are
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Your
Health
Picture,
https://www.23andme.com/?mkbanner=true (last visited January 2, 2021); Erika Check
Hayden, The Rise and Fall and Rise Again of 23andMe, NATURE (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://www.nature.com/news/the-rise-and-fall-and-rise-again-of-23andme-1.22801.
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speech rights.164 Opponents believe that these applications should not be
regulated because they simply process information or analyze data derived
from FDA-approved devices, such as gene sequencers.165 Free speech is at
issue because arguably such regulation unjustifiably impedes lawful
commercial speech and deprives consumers of wanted information.166 The
FDA justifies its regulatory approach by explaining that it oversees only
DTC tests for “moderate to high risk medical purposes” that could have a
significant impact on medical care, assessing their analytical validity,
clinical validity, and the companies’ claims about them.167 The courts have
not yet had an opportunity to rule on a First Amendment case involving
DTC tests.

C. The Future of Free Speech and Professional Regulation
What does the Supreme Court’s skepticism of speech limitations
mean for legal and medical regulatory activity in the future? In order to
consider how best to respond to the regulatory challenges posed by
technological innovation, it’s necessary first to consider how the Supreme
Court’s speech jurisprudence affects potential regulatory actions. This
section analyzes how the Court’s recent case law is likely to affect
regulatory power over professional speech. It makes three predictions for
the future of professional licensing. First, speech restrictions are likely to
be increasingly vulnerable to legal challenges, but licensing itself is
unlikely to go away any time soon. Second, health-care regulations are
more likely to be upheld than other professional speech restrictions. Third,
even if false speech carries constitutional protection, there is still room for
private litigation based on individual harm caused by such speech.
1. Speech Restrictions are Vulnerable to Challenge, but Licensing is
Unlikely to Disappear
It appears unlikely that the Court will back off its speech-protective
jurisprudence any time soon. In addition to the cases directly affecting
professional regulation, the Supreme Court has decided First Amendment
cases that signal its continuing commitment to place free-speech
principles over regulatory deference. Ten years ago in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, the Court recognized corporate free-speech
rights and relied on the First Amendment to strike down campaign finance
regulations.168 In doing so, the Court demonstrated an “increasing
tendency to construe the First Amendment as a shield that private market
Linnea M. Baudhuin, The FDA and 23andMe: Violating the First Amendment or Protecting
the Rights, of Consumers? 60 CLIN. CHEMISTRY 835–837 (2014); Adam Candeub, Digital
Medicine, the FDA, and the First Amendment, 49 GA. L. REV. 933, 968-69 (2015).
164

165

Candeub, supra note 164, at 939-40, 971-80.

166

Baudhuin, supra note 164, at 835.
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Id.
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Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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actors can wield against government regulation, rather than (as it once
did) as a mechanism for safeguarding free speech values against the threat
posed to them by both private and government power.”169
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this position recently, when it held
in a 5-4 decision that public-sector “access fees” charged to employees
opting out of union membership violated employees’ free-speech rights.170
In dissent, Justice Kagan sharply criticized the Court for “turning the First
Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic and
regulatory policy.”171 She warned that the Court’s free-speech
jurisprudence—including its decisions in Sorrell and NIFLA—could have
broad effects that threatened to overwhelm historical regulatory
approaches.172 She noted that “[s]peech is everywhere” and that “almost all
economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech.”173
Justice Kagan is undoubtedly right that all or nearly all regulatory
policy affects speech—and this is particularly true for professional
regulation in the fields of law and medicine. Nonetheless, the Court shows
no sign of backing off favoring speech over regulation, especially with the
recent turnover in membership.174
Furthermore, the areas where most challenges are currently being
raised in law and medicine would seem to be especially vulnerable under
the free-speech jurisprudence of the Roberts court. The legal profession’s
ban on outside investment, for example, has a substantial protectionist
basis and only a hypothetical public-protection rationale. Under NIFLA, a
mere hypothetical basis for public protection is likely insufficient to
support the regulation. If states cannot put forward evidence
demonstrating that the ban is narrowly tailored to protect against a
provable harm, the regulation is likely to be deemed unconstitutional.
Requiring extensive disclaimers regarding attorneys’ marketing speech
and banning non-lawyer advice on matters touching legal rights are both
similarly likely to fail under the NIFLA standard—and, to the extent that
such regulations are adopted by boards comprised predominantly of
practicing attorneys, may also give rise to antitrust challenges. Speech
Genevieve Lakier, The First Amendment's Real Lochner Problem, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1241,
1324 (2020).
170 Janus v. Am. Fedn. of State, County, and Mun. Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018).
169

171

Id. at 2501.

172

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

173

Id.

Lisa Soronen, SCOTUS and the Seismic Shift: What Might it Mean for States and Local
Governments?,
NATIONAL
LEAGUE
OF
CITIES
(2020),
https://www.nlc.org/article/2020/10/23/scotus-and-the-seismic-shift-what-might-itmean-for-states-and-local-governments/ (last visited Dec 28, 2020) ("The Supreme Court
usually hears numerous First Amendment free speech cases each term. It is not unusual
for states and local governments to lose these cases unanimously or close to it.").
174

29

55 UC DAVIS L.REV. (forthcoming 2022).

1/1/21

restrictions are similarly vulnerable on the medical side, as courts going
forward are unlikely simply to defer to the fact of state regulation. Instead,
under the Supreme Court’s more restrictive approach, courts will have to
provide a more searching analysis of both the bases for such regulations
and the processes by which they were adopted.
This more searching review will limit the government’s regulatory
power over the professions, but it will not eliminate it. Wholesale
abandonment of licensing is extremely unlikely. Even under the high bar
set by recent Supreme Court cases, the public-protection aspects of
licensing will likely outweigh the restrictions on liberty they impose.175 The
speech-restrictive actions taken by licensing entities, however, will have to
meet a higher standard to be upheld.
2. Health-Care Speech Restrictions Backed by Sound Evidence Are
More Likely to Survive
It’s possible that regulatory actions in the health-care arena will
more easily satisfy the Supreme Court’s higher bar than actions regulating
legal practice. Professional speech in the two fields is similar in many
ways. Both doctors and lawyers are highly trained. And regulation is
needed to protect vulnerable clients and patients who generally lack “the
specialized knowledge necessary to effectively evaluate” professional
advice.176
But the consequences of harm tend to be greater in medicine than
in law.177 Bad advice on medical matters is far more likely to lead to
physical injury or even death, and these consequences cannot be undone
by financial compensation.178 This may explain, in part, lower courts’
efforts to uphold speech-restrictive regulations related to health care.179 We
are already seeing courts grapple with whether these restrictions are
consistent with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. The easiest way to
reconcile these tensions may be to hold that even if a higher standard of
scrutiny applies, health-care regulations will survive a high level of

See Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. 501, 559 (2019) (‘The First
Amendment, it turns out, is a poor vehicle to challenge professional licensing regimes.”).
175

176
Cassandra Burke Robertson, How Should We License Lawyers?, 89 FORDHAM L. REV.__
(forthcoming 2021).
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Miller & Berkman, supra note 36, at 654 (recommending tying physician speech
protection to patient safety, and arguing that “[p]hysician speech is professional speech-not medical conduct--when treating it as such promotes patient safety, occurs within the
confines of a doctor-patient relationship, and is supported by evidence-based medicine”).
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See Jane R. Bambauer, Snake Oil Speech, 93 WASH. L. REV. 73, 83 (2018) (“If claims that
are very likely to be false are also likely to cause harm, the state can intervene on behalf of
public safety without imposing a singular and authoritative definition of truth.”).
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See supra Part III.B.
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scrutiny as long as they are backed by an evidentiary record showing a
positive effect on patient protection.180
At the same time, requiring an evidentiary record to uphold speech
restrictions would likely mean striking down some current speech
regulations. As discussed above, health care has sometimes been the
target of both compelled and forbidden speech mandates that are highly
politicized.181 Courts upholding such regulations have broadly deferred to
legislative actions.182 If heightened scrutiny is applied, regulations that
amount to “an attempt to skew the marketplace of ideas or invade the
buffer of confidentiality and autonomy that protects the integrity of the
professional-client relationship” are likely to fail.183 Regulations backed by
an evidentiary record, however, are more likely to survive.184 In this way,
heightened scrutiny actually increases courts’ ability to engage in quality
control and weed out requirements that are merely political.185
3. Private Litigation May Play a Role in Protecting Against False and
Harmful Professional Speech
What happens if legal or medical professionals engage in false
speech? To the extent that speech protection puts governmental regulation
at risk, it is possible that private law—and especially litigation—may play
a larger role in enforcing standards of professional care.186 Having a right
180

See Miller & Berkman, supra note 36 at 654 (noting that “there remain definitional
questions about how promotion of patient safety ought to be quantified, how a doctorpatient relationship ought to be recognized, and how much evidence (and of what type)
demonstrates evidence-based medicine).

181

See supra Part III.B. See also Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth First Amendment, 94 IND.
L.J. 1351, 1406 (2019) (“in some cases, the State might use (and has used) compelled
speech to force speakers to affirm an ideological viewpoint.”).
182

E.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is well recognized that
a state enjoys considerable latitude to regulate the conduct of its licensed health care
professionals in administering treatment.”).
183
Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV.
67, 112 (2016).
184

Jane R. Bambauer, The Empirical First Amendment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 960 (2017)
(“[E]mpirical studies and data can help improve the state's selection of political priorities
and the efficacy of its political solutions.”).
185

Of course, some regulations may have both an evidentiary basis and a political bent.
Politicization by itself is not a reason to strike down regulations affecting speech. See Robert
Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 910 (2015) (“Nor should
mandated factual disclosures become constitutionally disfavored because they occur in
circumstances of acrimonious political controversy. The need for sober factual disclosures
might be most urgent in the context of socially contested issues like tobacco or obesity.”).
Haupt, supra note 175 (suggesting that “foregrounding of the relevant private common
law” would protect against the risk of limiting regulation in areas such as “food labeling
requirements, most securities disclosures, professional responsibility rules for lawyers,
rules concerning doctor-patient confidentiality, and a host of other safety-based
regulations”). Couldn’t find the quote within the document referred to (was looking for the
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to engage in speech, after all, does not insulate professionals from
malpractice liability for harms caused when that speech amounts to fraud,
negligence, or ineptitude. It is true that taken to its logical extreme, freespeech principles could protect even negligent or fraudulent speech if
professional speech no longer has a categorical exclusion from First
Amendment protection.187 But even the elimination of a categorical
exclusion does not result in absolute protection for all speech—it merely
requires a higher level of scrutiny.188
The Supreme Court protects even blatantly untruthful speech on
First Amendment grounds in some circumstances. In U.S. v. Alvarez, the
Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act.189 The government had argued
that criminal prosecution for lying about military honors was allowable
because the First Amendment did not protect false speech.190 The
government pointed to defamation liability and fraud liability as
demonstrating that false speech could render an individual civilly and
criminally liable. The Supreme Court held that false speech was not
categorially excluded from the First Amendment, but rather that legal
limits on false speech may be more likely to survive heightened scrutiny.191
The Court explained that there must be a “direct causal link between the
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”192 When the speech is
diffuse and public-directed, as with lying generally about military honors,
the Court concluded that counterspeech should generally “suffice to
achieve [the government’s] interest.”193
The Court may be wrong about whether government speech will
suffice to protect the public interest in the face of false statements.194

187 Amanda Shanor, Business Licensing and Constitutional Liberty, 126 YALE L.J. FORUM
314, 320–21 (2016) (“If the “speaking” nature of a profession were sufficient to trigger
stringent review of the regulation of that profession, professional conduct such as
malpractice and fraud would be entitled to stringent review as well.”).

Thus, for example, a First Amendment challenge to a Florida restriction on personal
fundraising by judges failed; the Court applied heightened scrutiny, but nevertheless
concluded that the restriction was “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest,” and that therefore “the First Amendment poses no obstacle to its enforcement .
. . Florida may continue to prohibit judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign
funds, while allowing them to raise money through committees and to otherwise
communicate their electoral messages in practically any way.” Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar,
575 U.S. 433, 455 (2015).
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Nonetheless, the Alvarez opinion makes it clear that even false statements
will have constitutional protection. It is only when the risks created by
professional speech are high enough that restrictions will survive strict
scrutiny.195
Constitutional protection for false speech, however, does not mean that
professionals cannot be subject to liability for fraud or malpractice. The
harms caused by fraud and malpractice are almost certainly distinct and
concrete enough to allow the claims to survive heightened scrutiny.196
Applying strict scrutiny to professional speech does not insulate such
speech from liability. Instead, constitutional analysis is aimed only at
“filtering out government regulation that is not, in the classic sense,
targeted at preventing criminal, tortious, or palpably unethical
professional conduct.”197 But private lawsuits seeking compensation for
provable harm are likely to pass even a test of strict scrutiny.

IV.

PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION AT SCALE

The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence heightening speech
protection has created a regulatory challenge for states. If the shift toward
greater protection for professional speech had happened twenty or thirty
years ago, it probably would have been relatively simple to reach a new
regulatory equilibrium by backing off of some of the more protectionist
restrictions and building a stronger evidentiary record to support the
regulations that play a key role in protecting the public. Today, however,
it is more difficult to reach a new regulatory equilibrium because
technological advances—and in particular, massive digital platforms—
have changed the scale of professional influence and therefore changed
the entire regulatory context.198
What does it mean to regulate at scale? Professor Paul Ohm has
described the effect of “massive digital platforms” that affect the
somebody who is literally defined by thinking that everyone and everything is a lie and
against them and a conspiracy?").
195

Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010) (upholding restrictions on
attorney speech imposed by a “statute [that] is carefully drawn to cover only a narrow
category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups that
the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations”).
See John S. Ehrett, Speak No Evil, Do No Harm: A New Legal Standard for Professional
Speech Regulation, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 184, 191 (2018) (explaining that under a
harm-based analysis, “a vast swath of occupational licensing laws . . . that would otherwise
restrict speech with no substantial likelihood of doing harm to a client--would almost
certainly fail strict scrutiny review, and be struck down as unconstitutional,” but that “the
legal structures allowing for malpractice liability and lawsuits arising from false
advertising” would pass.).
196
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“mathematics of regulation.”199 He explains that law tends to work linearly,
while the “power and harm of online activity” grow at a much faster rate,
thus creating a situation in which regulatory policy fails to keep up with
its underlying goal of public protection.200 He points to the following: 1) the
ability of digital platforms to facilitate cross-border communication even
as regulatory authority remains jurisdictionally-bound, 2) the ability of a
single communication to achieve a much larger scale of influence,
potentially “touch[ing] the lives of billions,” and 3) the growth of artificial
intelligence (AI) programs that may come with unexpected externalities.201
These problems of regulatory scale affect regulatory policy in both
law and health care. Traditionally, professional speech occurred on an
individual basis: a doctor talking to a patient or a lawyer talking to a client.
Professional regulation accordingly relied primarily on licensing,
discipline, and exclusion from the profession to maintain quality and
safety standards. Thus, regulatory bodies licensed individuals qualified to
render advice, disciplined those whose advice breached the professional
standard of care, and excluded non-professionals from engaging in
conduct within the regulatory sphere. Of course, even under the
traditional approach, there have always been some questions at the
margin that didn’t fit well in the traditional regulatory scheme: Does a
bank that helps a client set up a trust engage in the unauthorized practice
of law? Does an herbalist who recommends dietary supplements to
individuals engage in unlicensed medical practice?202 But even though
these kinds of edge-cases received media attention and were the subject of
academic discussion, they were rare enough that they did not upend the
traditional structure of professional regulation that focused on individual
qualifications and one-to-one communications.
The scale of modern mass communication offers a much larger
threat to the viability of traditional regulatory approaches. Online forums
such as Reddit’s “legal advice” board allow individuals to pose questions
about their legal rights and remedies and to receive near-instantaneous
responses from around the globe, both from lawyers and laypeople. In the
medical sphere, Icliniq.com provides an “Ask a Doctor Online” service
through which users enter their health queries, create an account, and
receive medical advice from a doctor.203 Sibly is an employee wellness app
199

Id. at 546.

200

Id.

201

Id. at 548–52.

At least one state has upheld a criminal conviction for practicing medicine without a
license under this scenario. State v. Miller, 542 N.W.2d 241, 246-47 (Iowa 1995).
203 iCliniq, Ask a Doctor Online, https://www.iccliniq.com/ask-a-doctor-online (last visited
Nov. 22, 2020). iCliniq.com states that its “doctor panel consists of medical practitioners,
physicians and therapists from US, UK, UAE, India, Singapore, Germany and counting,”
About iCliniq, ICLINIQ.COM, https://www.icliniq.com/p/aboutus (last visited Nov. 17, 2020).
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that connects individuals to “helpful human coaches,”204 individuals who
are “trained in active listening, motivational interviewing, cognitive
behavioral tools and mindfulness models of change.”205
As a result of the challenge posed by massive digital platforms,
merely rebalancing the regulatory equilibrium will not go far enough to
meet the needs of public protection today. Instead, effective professional
regulation requires rethinking both the goals and methods of professional
regulation—and requires doing so within the speech-protective framework
adopted by the Supreme Court. This section examines the regulatory
challenges posed by modern technology. It begins with an analysis of
health care and medical practice, as this area is more comprehensively
regulated than legal practice. It examines the regulatory challenges posed
by telemedicine, artificial intelligence (AI) and the diffusion of false and
unreliable health information through social media. It then turns to the
field of legal practice, assessing how technology has a similar effect on legal
practice as it collapses geographic boundaries, enables mass
communication, and creates both opportunities and risks with the
integration of AI.

A. Health Care and Technology
Technology has changed the practice of medicine in profound ways.
It has enabled health care providers to reach far beyond their local offices
and to broaden their capabilities. However, technology also comes with
risks and shortcomings that require careful regulatory responses.
This part will address three areas of technology-enabled medical
practice: telemedicine, artificial intelligence, and communication through
social media.
1. Telemedicine
Telemedicine is “the diagnosis and treatment of patients through
telecommunications technology” such as smartphones, tablets, and
computers.206 Telemedicine is a subset of telehealth, which also includes
remote patient monitoring, remote communication among clinicians, and
other activities.207
204

Sibly, https://www.sibly.com/ (last visited Nov. 17,2020).

General Questions: Who Are Sibly Coaches? https://www.sibly.com/faqs (last visited
Nov. 17, 2020), Sibly’s terms of use explicitly state that “Sibly only provides an online
platform to connect users with coaches for one-on-one digital interfacing. Sibly Coaches
are not authorized to provide services requiring professional licensure (e.g. psychotherapy
or psychiatry.” In addition, Sibly asserts that it cannot guarantee the “competence of any
Sibly coach.” Sibly Terms of Use, SIBLY.COM, https://www.sibly.com/terms-of-use (last
visited Nov. 17, 2020).
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Medscape,
What
Is
Telemedicine?
https://www.medscape.com/courses/section/921359 (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).
207

Id.
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There are two types of telemedicine. The first is synchronous, or
real-time video encounters between patients and clinicians.208 Some realtime visits take place in medical offices so that a nurse or other assistant
can engage in hands-on assessment, such as taking blood pressure or
placing a stethoscope on the patient.209 The second form of telemedicine is
asynchronous, or “store-and-forward” communication.210 Here, health
care providers gather information about the patient, including the
patient’s narrative, lab results, images, videos, and medical records, and
send it securely online for analysis by another party, such as a
specialist.211 The patient then receives a diagnosis and treatment plan.212
Store-and-forward is often used for dermatology, pathology, and radiology
services.213
Experts estimate that in 2019, thirty percent of doctors and over
fifty percent of hospitals had access to telemedicine.214 In 2020, during
the COVID-19 pandemic, telemedicine use grew dramatically.215 This
option enabled patients to consult health care providers while remaining
socially isolated in the safety of their own homes.216

208

Id.
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Id.
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Id.; Eric Wicklund, Store-and-Forward Telemedicine Services Expand Connected Health,
INTELLIGENCE,
https://mhealthintelligence.com/features/store-and-forwardtelemedicine-services-expand-connected-health (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).
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Medscape, supra note 206; Wicklund, supra note 210.
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Medscape, supra note 206; Wicklund, supra note 210.
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COVID-19 and the Rise of Telemedicine, THE MEDICAL FUTURIST (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://medicalfuturist.com/covid-19-was-needed-for-telemedicine-to-finally-gomainstream/; Research Shows Patients and Clinicians Rated Telemedicine Care Positively
During
COVID-19
Pandemic,
PENN
MED.
NEWS
(June
24,
2020),
https://www.pennmedicine.org/news/news-releases/2020/june/patients-andclinicians-rated-telemedicine-care-positively-during-covid (reporting on a survey that
found that at Penn Medicine, “[i]n one week, … [the] gastroenterology and hepatology
practice went from doing roughly 5 percent of … visits per week with telemedicine to 94
percent”).
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Alicia Adamczyk, Can’t See Your Doctor in Person? Take Advantage of Your Telemedicine
Options, CNBC.COM (May 6, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/06/why-you-shouldtake-advantage-of-your-telemedicine-options.html.
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Telemedicine Benefits and Limitations
Telemedicine has many potential benefits.217 Telemedicine care can
be as effective as in-person care in many cases.218 A Massachusetts
General Hospital study found that among established patients, “[m]ost
patients (62.6%) and clinicians (59.0%) reported ‘no difference’ between
virtual and office visits on ‘the overall quality of the visit.’”219 A different
study focused on telemedicine in intensive care units that enables off-site
critical care experts to support patient care.220 The study found that
telemedicine “may reduce ICU mortality, hospital mortality, and lengths of
ICU stays” though not the overall length of hospital stays.221
In addition, telemedicine appointments can be very convenient for
patients, sparing them the need to travel to medical facilities and take
extended time off from work or find childcare coverage.222 Consequently,
patients may receive more continuous medical oversight and avoid care
disruptions.223 Telemedicine can also be less expensive than in-person
visits.224 According to one study, telemedicine visits on average cost $79,
217

Zawn Villines, Telemedicine Benefits: For Patients and Professionals, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/telemedicine-benefits.
218
Id.; Joel E. Barthelemy, Virtual Care vs. In-Person Visits: Which is Higher Quality?
GLOBALMED (July 15, 2019), https://www.globalmed.com/telemedicine-vs-in-personvisits-which-is-higher-quality/.
219

Karen Donelan et al., Patient and Clinician Experiences with Telehealth for Patient Followup Care, 25 AM. J. MANAG. CARE 40, 42 (2019).
220

Jing Chen et al., Clinical and Economic Outcomes of Telemedicine Programs in the
Intensive Care Unit: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 33 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 383,
384 (2018).
221

Id. at 391. See also, Astrid Buvik et al., Patient Reported Outcomes with Remote
Orthopaedic Consultations by Telemedicine: A Randomised Controlled Trial, 25 J.
TELEMEDICINE & TELECARE 451, 451 (2019) (“We did not observe any difference in patientreported satisfaction and health … between video-assisted and standard consultations”);
Khidir Dalouk et al., Outcomes of Telemedicine Video-Conference Clinic Versus In-Person
Clinic Follow-Up for Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Recipients, 10 CIRCULATION:
ARRYTHMIA
&
ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY
(2017),
https://www.ahajournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1161/CIRCEP.117.005217
(finding
that
outcomes for patients who received follow-up care by videoconferencing were “noninferior”
to outcomes for those receiving in-person follow-up); Jessica F. Robb et al., Comparison of
Telemedicine Versus In-Person Visits for Persons with Multiple Sclerosis: A Randomized
Crossover Study of Feasibility, Cost, and Satisfaction, 36 MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS (2019),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.msard.2019.05.001 (reporting that 97.1% of patients would
recommend televisits to others, and 94.3% of patients found it easy to connect with their
provider via telemedicine).
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Donelan et al., supra note 219, at 40.
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https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/telehealth.html (updated June 10,
2020).
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while in-person office visits cost $146.225 These benefits can be of
particular value to members of vulnerable populations that face access
barriers, such as the elderly, people with disabilities, or economically
disadvantaged individuals.226
Telemedicine can be beneficial for providers as well. If they do a
significant portion of their work through telemedicine, they may be able to
cut costs by renting smaller office spaces and paying for less
administrative assistance.227 In addition, they may be able to serve more
patients and supplement their incomes, and during COVID-19,
telemedicine enabled clinicians to reduce their risk of infection by avoiding
in-person contact with patients.228
At the same time, telemedicine has several risks and limitations. In
some cases, it is more appropriate to examine a patient face-to-face, and
pursuing a virtual consultation could delay urgently needed care or even
lead to a misdiagnosis.229 In addition, both the clinician and the patient
must be sufficiently adept with technology to avoid glitches, and,
depending on the medical problem, the patient may need to have a space
at home in which to conduct the visit privately.230 Other privacy concerns
may arise if the technology does not meet state-of-the art security
standards and is thus vulnerable to hacking.231 Finally, clinicians and
patients wishing to use telemedicine often face a variety of regulatory
barriers.
Telemedicine Regulation
Extensive regulations govern telemedicine.232 While technology
theoretically should enable clinicians to render services throughout the
225

J. Scott Ashwood et al., Direct-To-Consumer Telehealth May Increase Access to Care but
Does Not Decrease Spending, 36 HEALTH AFF. 485, 488 (2017) (concluding that because of
its convenience, telehealth increases utilization of medical services and therefore raises
overall health-care spending).
226
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See generally, CENTER FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POLICY, STATE TELEHEALTH LAWS &
REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES (Fall 2019), https://www.cchpca.org/sites/default/files/201910/50%20State%20Telehalth%20Laws%20and%20Reibmursement%20Policies%20Repor
t%20Fall%202019%20FINAL.pdf; Federation of State Medical Boards, Telemedicine Policies
Board
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Board
Overview,
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/keyissues/telemedicine_policies_by_state.pdf (last updated July 2020); Christian D. Becker et
al., Legal Perspectives on Telemedicine Part 1: Legal and Regulatory Issues, 23 PERMANENTE
J. 18-293 (2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6636526/pdf/18293.pdf.
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United States, they are often severely constrained by federal and state
laws. Nevertheless, telemedicine regulations demonstrate the ability of the
state and federal governments to accommodate changing demands and
circumstances in the health care arena.
One heavily regulated area is licensure. Ordinarily, physicians must
be licensed in each state in which they practice medicine, and this
principle is no different for telemedicine.233 This means that physicians
must be licensed in the state in which their patients are located.234
However, licensing policies have become somewhat more lenient in many
states.
Nine states issue special licenses or certificates that allow out-ofstate clinicians to provide telemedicine services in the state, and several
others permit the practice of medicine across state lines under certain
circumstances (without specifically mentioning telemedicine).235
Twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and Guam are
members of the Federation of State Medical Boards’ Interstate Medical
Licensure Compact (IMLC).236 The compact creates an expedited process
by which licensed physicians can obtain licenses in other states.237 Note
that the IMLC relaxes telemedicine barriers but does not remove them
entirely because physicians still need to obtain licensure in new states,
and not all states are IMLC members.
Three additional compacts facilitate licensure in multiple states.238
The Nurses Licensure Compact (with 34 member states) allows nurses to
serve in other states without obtaining additional licenses.239 The Physical
Therapy Compact (with 20 member states) allows eligible physical
therapists and physical therapy assistants to purchase compact privilege

233

Federation of State Medical Boards, supra note 232; Kocher, supra note 110. See e.g.,
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in member states and work without obtaining new licenses.240 The
Psychology Interjurisdictional Compact (with 15 member states) allows
psychologists licensed in member states to provide telepsychology services
or temporary in-person services in member states.241
Patients’ ability to obtain insurance coverage for telemedicine is
another area that is subject to regulation. Without insurance payments,
patients and clinicians are unlikely to use telemedicine. Forty states and
the District of Columbia have laws that address private insurers’
reimbursement for telemedicine services.242 However, only a few require
that private insurers pay equally for in-person and telemedicine
services.243
The United States’ primary public insurance programs, Medicaid
and Medicare, have also considered payment for telemedicine.244 Under the
Medicaid program, all states and the District of Columbia pay for some
However, only fourteen states
forms of live video telemedicine.245
246
reimburse for store-and-forward.
Medicare provides reimbursement for
telemedicine using an “interactive 2-way telecommunications system” in
limited circumstances, but it does not pay for store-and-forward
services.247
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Regulations regarding online prescribing also vary, with some states
embracing a more permissive approach than others.248 Most states
prohibit clinicians from writing prescriptions based exclusively on
patients’ answers to online questionnaires.249 Some states do not address
online prescribing, but many allow clinicians to conduct exams by
telemedicine for prescribing purposes.250
Some states do not authorize doctors who see patients only
remotely to prescribe controlled substances, but an increasing number
allow such prescriptions.251 The latter states have liberalized their laws in
response to the opioid crisis so that telemedicine clinicians can provide
medications such as methadone to treat opioid addiction.252
2. Artificial Intelligence
“Artificial intelligence,” (AI) refers to a computer’s ability to imitate human
behavior and learn.253 Computers learn with the help of algorithms. An
algorithm is a “computational procedure that takes some value, or set of
values, as input and produces some value, or set of values, as output.”254
It is thus “a sequence of computational steps that transform the input into
the output.”255 Health care providers may rely on AI to assist them in
making decisions or to be a substitute decision maker.256 Clinicians may
248

CENTER FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POLICY, supra note 232, at 9.

249

Id. See e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE, title 12, § 40.967(27) (establishing that unprofessional
conduct includes “providing treatment, rendering a diagnosis, or prescribing medications
based solely on a patient-supplied history that a physician licensed in this state received
by telephone, facsimile, or electronic format.”).
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input data about a patient’s symptoms, medical history, and personal
details and obtain a suggested diagnosis and treatment plan as the AI
output.257
A well-known type of AI is machine learning, which enables computers
to “automatically detect patterns in data, and then use the uncovered
patterns to predict future data or to perform decision-making tasks under
uncertainty.”258 Scientists prepare machine learning algorithms to engage
in analysis by using training data.259 For example, developers might show
a learning algorithm numerous tumor images with indications as to
whether they are cancerous.260 The algorithm should then learn to
distinguish between benign and malignant growths when it sees new
images.261
Some machine learning algorithms are trained only once and are
considered “locked,” providing the same results each time they are given
the same inputs.262 Others continuously learn and adapt so the outputs
they generate for specific inputs may change over time. 263
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Many algorithms are commonly used by physicians and thus influence
the treatment of numerous patients.264 They are thus becoming an
important component of professional medical speech.
AI Benefits and Limitations
AI can allow clinicians to analyze very large data sets quickly and
efficiently so that they can potentially deliver better health care less
expensively.265 AI can do some of the analytical work that paid staff would
otherwise do and can accomplish it more quickly and efficiently.266 AI can
also improve the quality of medical care.267 Learning algorithms can help
doctors determine which patients will respond well to different therapies
so that they can tailor their treatments accordingly.268 AI may also help
identify individuals at high risk of contracting particular diseases so that
doctors can screen them regularly.269
AI is also being harnessed to combat COVID-19.270 For example,
researchers are working to develop AI tools to predict which children will
suffer severe COVID-19 symptoms.271 Likewise, algorithms have been
trained to analyze computed tomography (CT) scans and identify COVID19-related pneumonia.272
Medical AI, however, is not devoid of hazards. First, AI can be flawed
and provide incorrect information or advice to doctors, leading to improper
264
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treatment choices.273 Learning algorithms can be poorly designed or
implemented. Moreover, the training data that is used to develop
algorithms may contain serious data errors or gaps.274
AI critics worry not only about medical mistakes, but also about
algorithmic bias.275 Algorithmic bias can lead to discrimination that
disadvantages particular groups.276 Bias can be rooted in the absence of
appropriate diversity in training data.277 For example, if the training data
come from a health system that serves primarily white and wealthy
patients, the algorithm may not be generalizable to other patients.278 It
might thus work well for privileged white patients but make mistakes with
respect to others.
To illustrate, an algorithm used to refer patients with chronic disease
to high-risk care management programs favored Whites over sicker
African-Americans.279 It used past medical expenditures as a proxy for
medical needs and interpreted low spending as indicating that an
individual is healthy.280 While this might be true for many people, health
care access barriers such as poverty and lack of insurance often prevent
African-Americans from pursuing adequate medical care.281 The algorithm
failed to take this into account and exacerbated the problem by also
excluding African Americans from beneficial disease management
programs.282
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In addition, training data may capture existing inequities, causing the
trained algorithm to perpetuate discrimination.283 For example, women
have been found to be less likely than men to receive lipid-lowering drugs,
in-hospital procedures, and proper care at hospital discharge despite
being more likely to have high blood pressure and heart failure.284
Algorithms developed from training data that reflect such under-treatment
will likely learn to recommend less intensive care for women than men
even though this approach is inappropriate.285
AI Regulation
The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approach to regulating AI
is currently uncertain and evolving.286 The agency acknowledges that its
“traditional paradigm of medical device regulation was not designed for
adaptive artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies.”287
The FDA generally does not extend its reach to algorithms that are
developed and used in-house by health-care providers.288 It does intend to
regulate certain types of software, such as software that analyzes
“physiological signals” for purposes of diagnosis or treatment.289 To that
end, the FDA has approved many algorithms used in the fields of radiology,
cardiology, and internal medicine.290 The FDA also intends to scrutinize AI
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tools that are opaque and do not enable clinicians to understand the basis
of recommendations, sometimes called black-box algorithms.291
The agency has thus far focused its regulatory efforts on locked
algorithms.292 In 2019, it published a discussion paper detailing its
“foundation for a potential approach to premarket review for artificial
intelligence and machine learning-driven software modifications.”293 But
the FDA has taken no further action to promulgate regulations for adaptive
AI.294
Congress has also shown interest in the issue of AI integrity. In 2019
Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Representative
Yvette Clarke (D-NY) introduced a bill called the “Algorithmic
Accountability Act.”295
The bill would do the following:
 Authorize the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to require covered
entities to conduct impact assessments of any highly sensitive
automated decision systems.
 Require covered entities to evaluate their automated decision
systems and associated training data in order to identify problems
in the areas of accuracy, fairness, bias, discrimination, privacy and
security.
 Require covered entities to assess their information systems’ ability
to protect data subjects’ privacy and safeguard data security.
 Require covered entities to resolve identified problems.296

Sara G. Murray et al., Discrimination by Artificial Intelligence in a Commercial Electronic
AFF.
BLOG
(Jan.
31,
2020),
Health
Record—A
Case
Study,
HEALTH
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200128.626576/full/.
291

292

Slabodkin, supra note 262. See text accompanying note 262 for explanation of locked
algorithms.
293

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 289.

294

Slabodkin, supra note 262.

S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019); Booker, Wyden, Clarke
Introduce Bill Requiring Companies To Target Bias In Corporate Algorithms,
BOOKER.SENATE.GOV (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/bookerwyden-clarke-introduce-bill-requiring-companies-to-target-bias-in-corporate-algorithms
[hereinafter Booker].
296 S. 1108, §§ 2(2), 2(6), 3(b); Booker, supra note 295. A covered entity would have included
any person, partnership, or corporation that is subject to FTC regulations and earns more
than $50 million annually, possesses or controls personal information from at least one
million people or consumer devices, or primarily acts as a data broker that acquires,
processes, and sells consumer data. S. 1108, § 2(5).
295

46

55 UC DAVIS L.REV. (forthcoming 2022).

1/1/21

The proposed Algorithmic Accountability Act was subject to a variety of
criticisms and did not become law.297 However, legislative action may be
more successful in the future and is an additional path to establish
algorithmic oversight and promote AI fairness.
3. Propagation of False Information
Technology enables individuals to reach almost limitless audiences and
to convey information nationally and internationally. This includes
information that is incorrect and even harmful.298 For example, in July of
2020 a video of doctors making false claims about COVID-19 went viral
after it was shared on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.299 In the video,
one doctor asserted that hydroxychloroquine, zinc, and Zithromax were a
cure for the pandemic, rendering masks unnecessary.300 Another argued
that lockdowns did not significantly decrease COVID-19 death rates.301 In
a different video, Dr. Annie Bukacek claimed that death certificates were
wrongly attributing deaths to COVID-19.302 In yet another viral video,
virologist Judy Mikovits falsely asserted that the number of COVID-19
deaths was inflated, that the virus was activated by face masks, and that
Dr. Anthony Fauci was responsible for the deaths of millions of HIV/AIDS
patients in the 1980s.303

B. Legal Advice and Technology
The rise of digital platforms has had three primary effects in the
practice of law. First, it has made it easier for legal practice to cross state
and even national boundaries. Second, it enables communication about
legal matters to extend far beyond the traditional lawyer-client
relationship. Finally, it has enabled the growth of AI systems that affect
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legal practice in ways that change the norms, expectations, and effects of
legal work. This subsection explores how each of those changes in the
scale of legal practice shapes the scope and results of regulatory policy.
1. Illusory Geographic Boundaries
The practice of law is regulated at the state level.304 But with modern
technology, state borders have little relevance to daily practice—lawyers
can often do their work from anywhere, meeting virtually with clients and
negotiating deals and settlements through email or video conferencing.
Unlike telemedicine, which is regulated extensively, there is little direct
regulation of virtual lawyering—instead, virtual and cross-border practice
is regulated largely through the application of regulations on the
unauthorized practice of law, which is often not a perfect fit.305
The gap between regulatory standards and common practice is
growing. From the standpoint of a reasonable lawyer, there is no reason
why a lawyer with expertise in a practice area shouldn’t assist clients in
need of that expertise even when the lawyer and client reside in different
states. Research also shows that regulatory overreach in UPL enforcement
negatively affects access to justice.306
But when a lawyer in Colorado tried to help his in-laws in
Minnesota negotiate a debt-collection action, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the Colorado lawyer had engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.307 The attorney hadn’t charged his in-laws a fee, hadn’t
claimed to be licensed in Minnesota, hadn’t appeared in a Minnesota court,
and hadn’t practiced beyond his level of competence. Nonetheless, the
court held that by attempting to negotiate a debt for Minnesota residents
against a Minnesota creditor in a dispute arising under Minnesota law, the
lawyer had engaged in the practice of law “in Minnesota.”308 Because the
lawyer was licensed only in Colorado, the court upheld the admonition
304
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American Legal Profession in A Global Age, 48 S.D. L. REV. 489, 498 (2011) (explaining that
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imposed by the disciplinary panel.309 One dissenting judge would have
interpreted state law to find representation to be “reasonably related” to
the lawyer’s Colorado practice and therefore allowed under Minnesota
law.310 Neither the majority nor the dissent grappled with the
constitutionality of restricting cross-border speech.
The question of cross-border practice was also raised in Ohio when
Kentucky-licensed attorney Alice Auclair Jones applied for admission to
the Ohio bar. Jones originally lived, worked, and was licensed in Kentucky.
She worked for a firm that had offices in both Kentucky and Cincinnati.
After getting married, she moved to Cincinnati where she continued to
work for the firm representing her Kentucky-based clients while she
applied for admission to the Ohio bar.311 Jones was careful to work
exclusively on matters “before Kentucky tribunals arising under Kentucky
law” and avoid working on any matters arising under Ohio law, affecting
Ohio clients, or coming before Ohio courts.312 She did not hold herself out
as an Ohio-licensed attorney, and continued to use letterhead with contact
information for the firm’s Kentucky office.313 Nonetheless, the Ohio Board
of Commissioners on Character and Fitness recommended that her
admission to the Ohio bar be denied, concluding that her physical
presence in Ohio while her application was pending amounted to the
unauthorized practice of law in Ohio.314
The matter went up to the Ohio Supreme Court with substantial
amicus participation from national law firms. The court ultimately ruled
that Jones could be admitted to practice in Ohio, holding that her preadmission presence in Ohio could be deemed “temporary” because she had
applied for admission and that the practice therefore was not
“unauthorized” under Ohio law.315 While the majority did not need to reach
the question of whether the result was constitutionally mandated, a
concurring opinion did address the constitutional issues.
The concurring justices acknowledged that technology had outpaced
regulation, stating that “before the advent of the Internet, electronic
communication, and the like, a lawyer who worked in Ohio was almost
always practicing Ohio law,” but that now it was easy for an attorney to
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physically reside in the state while practicing outside of it.316 The
concurring justices would have held that the state had no interest in
regulating the legal practice of “a lawyer who is not practicing Ohio law or
appearing in Ohio courts.”317 The concurring justices pointed to instances
in which lawyers might practice across a state border but maintain “a
secondary office inside their homes so that they can access their files
remotely” or might live and practice elsewhere but keep an “Ohio vacation
home on Lake Erie” in which they spend summers. Under the majority
opinion, such attorneys would still be required to seek licensure in Ohio.
Under the concurring opinion, however, the state would have no interest
in regulating this practice and could not constitutionally forbid it.
2. One-to-Many and Many-to-Many Communication
In addition to more commonly crossing geographic boundaries, the
provision of legal advice has also expanded beyond the traditional clientlawyer relationship. The growth of massive digital platforms has changed
the scale of communication about legal information. This has meant that
more information about legal matters is available directly to the public
even without legal representation. As Professor Robert Kry has pointed
out, “technological advances have enabled clients to access a wealth of
advice with minimal time and expense.”318 Greater accessibility of
information means both that a single expert can more easily reach a broad
audience (one-to-many communication) and that groups of people can
more
easily
collaborate
(crowdsourcing,
or
many-to-many
communication).319
Both of these communication patterns have implications for the
regulation of legal practice. The ability to communicate with a large
audience fuels companies such as LegalZoom and others that provide
routine legal forms and non-specialized advice on “simple document
preparation, such as wills, incorporation documents, and name-change
petitions” to a broad audience.320 The ability to crowdsource legal
information has led to new forums popping up online, providing legal
advice for people who may not be able to afford to hire lawyers or may not
trust their own lawyer’s advice.321
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Crowdsourced advice is not always good advice, of course, as
“[l]awyers who quickly dispense advice do not have time to fully investigate
the facts,” while “non-lawyers may lack information both about the facts
and the law.”322 Nonetheless, forums such as Reddit’s r/legaladvice are
increasingly active. The Reddit forum alone has over 1.4 million members
and enables individuals to seek advice on matters such as how to obtain
embassy assistance in returning a minor citizen to the United States,323
whether a tenant could be evicted for non-payment,324 and whether a
sibling’s drug addiction would provide grounds for an individual to seek
custody of the sibling’s child.325 It’s true that crowdsourcing isn’t the best
way to handle important legal matters. But legal representation is often
financially out of reach even for relatively well-off Americans, so seeking
advice online may be the most accessible source of information about the
law for many people.326
Crowdsourced advice doesn’t just cover the substance of legal
matters. Instead, it can also serve as a way of monitoring lawyer quality.
Just as online reviews have cropped up for everything from restaurants to
cookbooks, they have also become a major source of information for
individuals seeking to hire an attorney.327 Over the last twenty years,
prospective clients increasingly rely on Internet searches rather than
simply on recommendations from family and friends.328
The rise of online reviews of attorneys has created both challenges
and opportunities for lawyer regulation. The challenges arise from the
psychological dynamics at play with online reviews—lawyers who feel
threatened both personally and professionally are likely to lash out in
response, answering negative reviews defensively and sometimes revealing
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confidential or privileged information in doing so.329 But the practice also
creates opportunities, as client reviews can be helpful in monitoring
attorney competence and diligence, sometimes bringing problems to light
that might otherwise have escaped disciplinary attention.330 It is true that
clients typically lack the substantive legal knowledge that would allow
them to evaluate matters of technical competence. Nevertheless, even
clients without such specialized knowledge can still effectively evaluate
non-technical matters that play into an attorney’s competence, most
importantly responsiveness, communication, and billing practices.331 This
information can play a useful role both in helping prospective clients
identify attorneys they might (or might not) want to hire, and in helping
disciplinary bodies identify potential problems.
3. Integrating Artificial Intelligence into Legal Practice
Artificial intelligence (AI) is playing an increasingly large role in legal
practice just as it does in medical practice. In some cases, the legal system
is required to grapple with the consequences and biases of AI. For example,
three individuals—all Black men—were wrongfully arrested as a result of
errors in a facial identification tool.332 Even though the cases did not
proceed to a conviction, the arrest and initial detention created significant
disruption in the lives of those wrongly accused.333
Moreover, facial identification is only the beginning. Once a person
is arrested, some local justice systems will use “an algorithm that
evaluates the defendant’s risk [of reoffending] rather than money to
determine whether a defendant can be released before trial.”334 These
algorithms are prone to bias and error. One study revealed that an
algorithm incorrectly labeled Black defendants as likely to reoffend almost
twice as frequently as it did White defendants, and it mislabeled White
defendants as low-risk more often than Black defendants.335 The legal
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profession hasn’t yet established a way to address AI harm or to
systematically consider whether the benefits of algorithmic assessments
outweigh their potential hazards.
Artificial intelligence also plays an increasingly large role in the dayto-day practice of law. Lawyers may not be aware of the extent to which
they are increasingly integrating AI into ordinary legal practice. One author
has explained how AI is embedded in everyday legal-research tools:
Anybody using Google for any sort of research is using one
of the world’s most advanced AI-backed tools for legal work,
whether they’re looking into an opponent’s business entities,
combing through news articles for a quote to cite, trying to
find the right government agency website for filing a form, or
looking for a legal blog post summarizing the implications of
an obscure subsection of ERISA they’ve never heard of.336
Artificial intelligence may also be integrated into more specialized
systems. IBM’s Ross, for example (a version of the Watson AI platform
tailored to legal practice), garnered a great deal of attention in legal
circles.337 Ross was described as the “world’s first AI lawyer” and was added
to Baker & Hostetler’s bankruptcy practice several years ago.338
When used for legal research and information management,
artificial intelligence systems can offer significant benefits by making
information more easily available. Many companies are already integrating
AI into their contract-review processes—a big task when “large enterprises
will have millions of outstanding contracts, with thousands of different
counterparties, across numerous internal divisions.”339 AI systems allow
companies to move away from a siloed approach to information and can
allow for easier access to the details of thousands of contracts at once,
facilitating comparison, standardization, and management of contractual
obligations.
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Artificial intelligence also makes it easier to analyze thousands of
litigation outcomes at once and thus to predict the likely outcome of future
cases. According to one company, “its AI can predict case outcomes with
90% accuracy.”340 The ability to predict litigation outcomes can, in turn,
improve advice to clients about whether it is worth pushing forward with
a lawsuit and how much it is worth paying to do so. Making it easier to
estimate a case’s value likewise increases the comfort level of outside
litigation funding entities and thus makes it more likely that lawsuits will
be able to attract outside funding.341
The legal system’s greater reliance on artificial intelligence will
almost certainly change the legal system in both foreseeable and
unforeseeable ways. One predictable effect is that adopting new AI systems
may be more attractive to corporate clients than to the law firms that serve
them. Most law firms, after all, bill by the hour and profit from the value
added by human analysis.342 Corporations, on the other hand, reap
significantly greater benefits from being able to synthesize legal knowledge
quickly and reduce the hours dedicated to organizing and maintaining
legal information.
New technology can be both very helpful and very flawed—thus
encouraging users to rely on it without fully understanding its limitations.
Professor Brian Sheppard has described concerns about “skill fade” and
“out of the loop problems” that can arise from the integration of AI
systems.343 Skill fade occurs when lawyers come to rely so heavily on
computer-assisted analysis that they cannot conduct the analysis
themselves. This phenomenon has been identified in other areas. It has
been noted, for example, that “autopilot can lead to a decline in pilot
skill.”344 A fully mature technology might be reliable enough that it won’t
matter if human skills are lost. But we are not yet at that point.
The same process is likely to play out in AI systems used in health
care and legal practice.345 Sometimes the value added outweighs the
erosion of skill so strongly that there is little net loss. Computer-aided
340
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citation checking, for example, is both faster and more comprehensive
than old-fashioned Shepardizing with books was.346 But when skill is lost,
individuals may lack the knowledge to recognize when “out of the loop”
problems occur—that is, when problems crop up that the underlying
algorithm fails to recognize or address.347
Skill fade and out-of-the-loop problems are likely to occur when
technological ability outstrips its reliability. Computerized systems are
growing increasingly able to augment or replace legal work, but this growth
is currently uneven, resulting in “incomplete innovation.”348 This uneven
development creates a risk that individuals will be tempted to over-rely on
algorithmic analysis before it has progressed to a point where it is reliable
enough to substitute for human judgment.349 The benefits of AI-assisted
legal analysis are so strong that there is little doubt their role will expand.
As the legal system’s reliance on algorithms grows, it becomes increasingly
important to “adopt approaches that preserve our ability and motivation
to monitor and assess the justice system itself.”350

V.

RETHINKING REGULATION AT SCALE

Professional regulation in the twenty-first century faces two converging
trends. First, the Supreme Court has adopted stricter control on the
regulation of speech, limiting the scope and structure of professional
regulatory authority. Second, the growth of massive digital platforms and
technological innovations are re-shaping both law and health care, giving
rise to new regulatory challenges. This creates difficulty for state
regulatory authorities, because the new Supreme Court jurisprudence
346
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seems to limit their power just as new problems emerge and need
attention.
But even if the convergence of these trends creates a certain amount of
difficulty, it also creates new opportunities for creative regulation that
safeguards constitutional rights. As scholar David Han has pointed out,
“technological change plays a vital role in the evolution and development
of constitutional rights doctrine.”351 He argues that “the destabilizing force
of technological change on constitutional rights doctrine ultimately serves
as a valuable opportunity for courts to reevaluate, in a deep and
meaningful manner, the fundamental theoretical, intuitional, and
empirical judgments that underlie the existing doctrinal framework.”352
This section examines what such reevaluation might look like for
professional regulation in law and in health care. If regulators can no
longer rely primarily on speech-restrictive regulatory approaches, what
can they do instead? The crux of our argument is that incremental change
in the traditional state regulatory process is insufficient to meet the
challenges posed by changes in technological scale. Instead, it is time to
ask the bigger questions about the underlying goals and first principles of
professional regulation. We propose three areas of reform that account for
changes in both the scale of professional speech and jurisprudential limits
on regulation.

A. Letting Go of Obsolete Regulatory Approaches
The first area of reform is to jettison regulatory approaches that no
longer play a role in protecting the public’s well-being. Scholars have noted
the presence of “regulatory inertia,” which “can be hard to break without
an external shock, usually a tragedy or massive failure that reignites
interest in regulation.”353 The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 provided such
an external shock, and both law and medicine were quick to respond in
ways that swiftly integrated technology and removed protectionist barriers.
As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, federal and state
regulators further relaxed several rules in order to encourage doctors to
offer telemedicine rather than in-person patient appointments.354 These
nimble responses to the pandemic illustrate the potential for regulatory
flexibility. Examples of temporary measures that government authorities
implemented in 2020 include:
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Some states loosened or eliminated particular licensing
requirements so that clinicians could serve patients in other states
without obtaining additional licenses.355



The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued
waivers that eliminated barriers to telemedicine use for Medicare
These include expanding the types of eligible
patients.356
practitioners and allowing audio-only services.357



CMS announced a temporary payment parity program for Medicare
by which clinicians could be paid equally for telemedicine and inperson visits.358



Some states relaxed their Medicaid requirements.359 These policies
include expanding the categories of clinicians that can be
reimbursed for telemedicine visits and paying for telemedicine
treatment of new patients that did not previously have an in-person
visit.360

Regulations affecting the practice of law were also loosened in
response to the pandemic. For the first time in its 231-year history, the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments remotely.361 Other courts held video
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hearings and even experimented with jury trials by video conference.362 Law
firms allowed lawyers to work out of their houses, increasing pressure on
state regulators to acknowledge that “remote working” should be “outside
the purview” of unauthorized practice restrictions.363 Difficulties in holding
an in-person bar examination also caused some states to loosen initial
licensing restrictions and increased support for diploma privilege.364
Regulatory policies that were loosened for the pandemic should be
re-evaluated when the pandemic is over. Not every change needs to be
made permanent, but innovations and technological advances that were
borne out of necessity might suggest areas in which older restrictions have
outlived their value.

B. Increasing Government Speech
In addition to abandoning outdated policies, professional regulatory
entities should become more vocal advocates in areas where their actions
can have the greatest public benefit. The Supreme Court has hinted that
government entities should consider ramping up efforts to engage in their
own communication. In Sorrell, for example, the Supreme Court suggested
that if Vermont was “displeased that detailers who use prescriberidentifying information are effective in promoting brand-name drugs,” then
it could “express that view through its own speech.”365
Governmental speech can reflect regulatory policy directly, without
going through licensed professionals as intermediaries. It therefore allows
regulatory entities to engage in “complete editorial control.”366 Such
editorial control may be especially useful in combatting problems of
misinformation shared online. Social media has enabled attorneys and
medical practitioners to reach international audiences, sometimes
disseminating conspiracy theories and other pernicious information.367
Medical and legal professionals often have outsized influence because they
appear to be credible experts,368 and thus their falsehoods can do great
harm.
362
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Regulating professional speech is challenging in light of First
Amendment concerns.369 States have developed different approaches to
disciplining physicians for misleading speech, though some of the policies
may be vulnerable to First Amendment challenges. California’s Manual of
Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary Guidelines, establishes
penalties for dishonesty that is “substantially related to the qualifications,
function or duties of a physician and surgeon but not arising from or
occurring during patient care, treatment, management or billing.”370 This
would presumably encompass statements made on social media. The
minimum penalty for such misconduct is “stayed revocation, 5 years
probation” and the maximum penalty is license revocation.371 Minnesota
may discipline physicians even more broadly for “any unethical or
improper conduct,” including conduct likely to deceive, defraud, or harm
the public.”372 Disciplinary measures can include license revocation or
suspension, revocation or suspension of registration to conduct interstate
telemedicine, placement of limitations or conditions on a physician's
practice, civil penalties of up to $10,000 per violation, and more.373 By
contrast, Texas does not include dishonesty or spreading false information
to the public as acts subject to discipline by the state medical board.374
It is possible that restrictive disciplinary policies would survive the
Supreme Court’s application of heightened review. To prevail, the state
would have to develop a strong evidentiary record of the harms caused by
the false statements as well as the lack of a narrower way to combat those
harms.375 In addition, the state would bear the burden of proving falsity—
a difficult proposition when it comes to professional speech, as
professional opinion may differ in areas without scientific consensus.
Nevertheless, because of the reach and impact of social media, state
boards should not turn a blind eye to legal and medical professionals’
misconduct via these platforms. When the government can develop proof
of direct harm from false speech, it can sustain professional discipline even
under Alvarez.376 The adoption of an intermediate-scrutiny standard for
professional speech—a possibility left open by NIFLA— would increase the
likelihood that states could develop an evidentiary record sufficient to
tiktok-youtube-misinformation-pandemic/ (“Their medical credentials give their thoughts
on the virus added weight.”).
369
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discipline professionals who disseminate false information likely to cause
harm.377 But when creating an adequate evidentiary record is challenging,
it may be easier for government entities to let their own voices be heard in
order to counter falsehoods.
The government can engage in direct public education, can
publicize areas of scientific agreement, and can communicate its own
viewpoint.378 The Supreme Court’s case law has been largely protective
both of individual speech and of governmental speech.379 When the
government regulates others’ speech, content-based restrictions are
judged by heightened scrutiny.380 But when the government itself is the
speaker, heightened scrutiny does not apply.381
To the extent that regulatory entities are concerned about the
dissemination of false speech online (and they should be concerned about
it), the best course of action might be for regulatory entities to engage in
their own efforts at public education rather than feeling bound to maintain
neutrality even when it contradicts professional consensus. Indeed,
during the COVID-19 epidemic government speech became a vital public
health tool. Messaging about the importance of wearing masks and social
distancing was ever-present and indispensable in the face of dangerous
conspiracy theories and irresponsible risk-taking.382
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C. Coordinating Beyond Borders
Finally, just as legal practice and health care have expanded beyond
traditional borders, so too must regulatory authority. This requires looking
beyond mere state-based professional licensing. Regulatory policy might
cross state or even national borders. But regulatory coordination might
also cross more theoretical boundaries, bringing together different
professional disciplines or engaging in creative public-private
partnerships.
1. Coordination of Professional Disciplines
As this article has shown, there is a great deal of similarity in the
regulatory challenges faced by different professions. Especially when it
comes to the challenges posed by technological innovation, regulatory
authorities should work together to identify areas of common concern. The
growth of artificial intelligence, for example, raises concerns that are not
unique to any particular discipline—issues of racial or gender bias in
algorithms, skill fade, and out-of-the-loop problems exist wherever AI is
implemented. Government entities should set up regulatory structures
that provide input from law, medicine, and other professions and allow
cross-disciplinary coordination to develop best practices for integrating
and optimizing emerging technologies.
2. Public-Private Collaboration
Many of the “regulation at scale” issues in professional regulation arise
from the widespread influence of massive digital platforms. When possible,
governmental authorities should collaborate with these platforms and
integrate them into regulatory policies. Thus, for example, online review
sites have created new regulatory challenges, especially when
professionals seek to respond to negative reviews online, but they also offer
additional information, giving regulatory authorities a limited window to
client and patient concerns.383 Professional regulatory bodies should seek
to work with the larger platforms and internet intermediaries. The private
entities may welcome assistance in developing content moderation
guidelines and might also offer a forum for government speech that
educates the public about professional standards and regulatory
procedures.384
3. Geographic Flexibility
Technology enables attorneys and medical clinicians to practice on
a national scale through telemedicine and online legal practice.385
383
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Consequently, it makes little sense to continue to regulate attorneys and
physicians exclusively on a state by state basis. Moreover, facilitating the
practice of law and medicine across state borders would enhance
underserved populations’ access to health care and legal assistance.
Individuals who live in rural areas with few lawyers or medical specialists
could obtain the services of highly skilled professionals by electronic
means without the cost of travel. As noted above, regulators have already
removed barriers to a more national practice of telemedicine.386 States
have established mechanisms of special licenses or compacts to facilitate
interstate licensure.387
Long before COVID-19, advocates called for full reciprocity of state
medical licenses, not just for purposes of telemedicine. For example, in
2014 the prominent Health Affairs Blog published a piece arguing that
“states should adopt mutual recognition agreements in which they honor
each other’s physician licenses.”388 Calls for a permanent change have
gained momentum during the current pandemic.389 Physicians have
argued that state licensure restrictions defy logic because human anatomy
is the same everywhere on the planet and medical training is regulated at
a national level.390 Moreover, COVID-19 has shown that licensure barriers
can deprive patients of desperately needed care and cost lives.391 In the
coming months and years, regulatory authorities should carefully evaluate
the benefits and shortcomings of state-by-state licensure requirements
with an eye to determining the extent to which they can be further relaxed.
When it comes to the practice of law, states have made concerted
efforts to coordinate their licensing practices. A majority of states now offer
the Uniform Bar Exam, replacing the prior patchwork of exam coverage
and practices.392 This is a good first step, but more is needed. In law, as in
medicine, overly broad state prohibitions on unauthorized practice have
386
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inhibited practice flexibility and client access. Coordinating policy between
the states could help avoid regulatory overreach, allowing states to focus
on areas of real importance. The states should build on earlier
coordination that led to the adoption of the Uniform Bar Exam and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.393 The Model Rules already provide
some guidance for what kinds of conduct will fall under each jurisdiction’s
regulatory authority.394 The states should take this coordination a step
further, adopting uniform rules to protect lawyers’ ability to live in one
state while practicing law in another. They should also establish national
norms that define the “practice of law” in a way that protects the rights of
non-lawyers to engage in speech about legal matters.395

VI.

CONCLUSION

Regulatory bodies are facing new challenges in enforcing standards
of care and providing professional oversight. The Supreme Court has
grown increasingly protective of professionals’ free speech rights and has
thereby limited the government’s power to engage in traditional regulatory
activities that might limit professional speech. At the same time,
technological developments, including the growth of massive digital
platforms and the introduction of artificial intelligence programs, create
brand new regulatory challenges. The convergence of these two trends
means that incremental change in the traditional state regulatory process
will be ineffectual. We propose three primary pathways for reform: 1)
abandoning obsolete regulatory approaches, 2) engaging in direct
government speech to counter the growth of misinformation, and 3) most
importantly, coordinating beyond traditional borders—that is, breaking
down disciplinary separations, coordinating public and private
enterprises, and moving toward more national oversight. Only by asking
the bigger questions about the underlying goals and first principles of
professional regulation can the government rise to the challenges posed by
technological development in a way that preserves professionals’ freespeech rights.
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